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ARTICLES
Glasnost and Perestroika: An Evaluation of
the Gorbachev Revolution and Its
Opportunities for the West
HAROLD E. ROGERS, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Russian Bear is stirring from a long winter's nap, and to the
surprise of the western world, is showing a new, friendly smile. The rea-
son for the changed appearance, according to its new masters, is the effect
of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) now sweeping Rus-
sia. These changes are so broad and fundamental that they stir world
speculation and hope that the cold war may be ending."
The principal author of these changes is Mikhail Gorbachev who, in
March, 1985, became General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party.'
Since his appointment as Party General Secretary, Gorbachev has star-
tled the world with a dazzling succession of new plans and proposals
aimed at slowing the arms races, democratizing Soviet society," reforming
* Harold E. Rogers, Jr. is an attorney practicing in San Mateo, California, a graduate of
Stanford University (majoring in History) and of the Stanford Law School. For this article,
Mr. Rogers has drawn on his personal observations and conversations in the Soviet Union
during travels there in 1971, 1982, 1985, 1987, and 1988 and upon a variety of personal
meetings in the United States in recent years with Soviet diplomats posted to the Soviet
Consulate in San Francisco, and upon recent research conducted at Stanford University and
its Hoover Institution.
1. See TimE, July 27, 1987, at 12.
2. After waiting patiently in the wings following the death of his mentor Yuri Andropov
in 1984, Gorbachev on March 10, 1985, at age 54, was named General Secretary, within 24
hours of the death of Andropov's successor, Konstantin Chernenko. By April, 1985, the Cen-
tral Committee had put its preliminary stamp of approval on Gorbachev's far-reaching pro-
posals for opening Soviet society and restructuring its economy. It was obvious from the
rapidity with which Gorbachev consolidated his position after Chernenko's death, that his
plans had been formulated and his key allies selected well before his succession to the top
Soviet post. See generally William G. Hyland, The Gorbachev Succession, 63 FOREIGN AFF.
800 (Spring 1985). See also C. SCHMIyr-HAUER, GORBACHEV-THE PATH TO POWER 112-114
(1986).
3. For an outline of his disarmament proposals see M. GORBACHEV, THE RESULTS AND
LESSONS OF REYKJAVIK (1986).
4. In a speech to the Central Committee on January 27, 1987, Gorbachev discussed his
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its long stagnant economy, and restoring Soviet influence in the world.
While many in the West are applauding the fresh new winds emanating
from Soviet Russia,' others are speculating that with a less menacing de-
meanor and in a more conventional western manner, Gorbachev could
prove to be a far more dangerous threat than his predecessors.' To para-
phrase the American Bolshevik admirer John Reed, the Russian Revolu-
tion created by Gorbachev7 is "shaking the world," and because of its




The centerpiece of perestroika in the Soviet Union is economic re-
form.8 The utopian promises of Marx and Lenin9 have not materialized."0
Gorbachev and his supporters recognize that the Soviet economy has
reached a pre-crisis state and that unless fundamental, far-reaching
proposals for democratizing Soviet society, including the replacement of incompetent lead-
ers at the top with an influx of new faces, and secret ballot elections of local officials and
factory bosses. Pravda and Izvestia, January 28, 1987, at 1-5; The Current Digest of the
Soviet Press, XXXIX, No. 6., 1987, at 8-10.
5. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, upon the occasion of Gorbachev's first
visit to Britain in 1984 remarked: "I like him. We can do business together." SCHMIr-
HAUER, supra note 2, at 8.
6. Moscow News, July 19, 1987, at 6, reporting on an article by Egon Bahr, in the West
German magazine Vorworts (No. 24).
7. John Reed, an American journalist sympathetic to Lenin and the Bolshevik revolu-
tion of 1917, wrote an account of the revolution entitled TEN DAYS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD.
He is buried in the Kremlin wall in Moscow. See Moscow News, supra note 6, at 13.
8. In his newly published book Mikhail Gorbachev has outlined the historical develop-
ment and application of restructuring in the Soviet Union, in amplification of the detailed
outline of his new economic program set out in his June 25, 1987, speech to the Central
Committee. M. GORBACHEV, PEREsTRoIKA-NEw THINKING FOR OUR CouNTRY AND THE
WORLD (1987).
9. For a very readable account of the life and writings of both Marx and Lenin see J. K.
GALBRAITH, THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY (1977).
10. The promise of Communism as portrayed by Marx and Lenin is that if workers
take control of government, and free from exploitation, supply all man's economic require-
ments, class conflict will cease and government will wither away. Marx postulated that there
would first be required a dictatorship of the proletariat (workers) who would overthrow the
exploiting bourgeoisie (capitalist class). Initially there would be socialism during which
workers would be paid in accordance with their contribution ("to each according to his
work") Ultimately when material wants were satisfied, a state of communism would ensue in
which each worker would contribute according to his ability and receive according to his
needs. Jealousy and competition would presumably disappear, along with the achievement
of plenty provided by the new economy. Socialism required that the government (workers)
would own and control the means of production to prevent exploitation of workers by the
bourgeoisie owners of capital. See J. BARRON, KGB TODAY-THE HIDDEN HAND 10 (1983). In
contrast to today's reality, the Twenty Second Congress of the Communist Party in 1961
declared that by 1980 the Soviet Union would achieve the utopia of true communism. Little
is heard about this boast today.
VOL. 16:2,3
GORBACHEV REVOLUTION
changes are made, Russia will continue to fall further behind the West in
almost every measure of economic development, technology, standard of
living and military." In addition, since Communism is becoming an evi-
dent failure at home, it is increasingly difficult for the Soviets to sell it as
the wave of the future to third world and other countries.
Gorbachev recognizes likewise that more than cosmetic changes will
be required-that the problems are endemic to the system. Since the
Communist Party rulers have invested their entire political capital in the
sanctity of Marxist-Leninist theory and its Stalinist legacy as the ulti-
mate scientific truth about the behavior of society and the economy,1
2
enormous skill in theory' and politics will be required to orchestrate a
credible about-face in the thrust of the Soviet economy without simulta-
neously creating a political revolution. "
Because of the long totalitarian tradition beginning with the early
Czars and Russian princes, and continuing with the Communists, changes
in the Soviet Union have quite often been accomplished by violence, in-
cluding assassination.' 5 Through draconian measures, including terror im-
11. For an excellent discussion of the general economic problems facing Gorbachev, see
M. Goldman, Gorbachev and Economic Reform, 64 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 56 (1985). A particular
problem of the Soviets with their centrally planned economy has been their failure to
master the new high technology sweeping the world. Since the life cycle of many new prod-
ucts is only two or three years, by the time the Soviets have learned a new process, it often
is already obsolete. Id. at 58.
12. Professor Richard Pipes of Harvard argues that among the ruling elite in the Soviet
Union (the "nomenklatura," some 40,000 strong), there is a nostalgia for the order and disci-
pline of Stalinism. Over the years these ruling party members have maintained their power
and privilege by fear and strict control (through the KGB and its predecessors), and
through aggressiveness and threats of war. Democratization will thus require the nomen-
klatura to give up power. Gorbachev must overcome this legacy of fear and control to free
creative energies of the Soviet people. See R. Pipes, Can the Soviet Union Reform, 63 FoR-
EIGN AFF. 47 (1984). See also Ford, The Soviet Union: The Next Decade, 62 FOREIGN AFF.
1137 (1984).
13. A. N. Yakovlev, orchestrator of Gorbachev's international publicity for glasnost and
recently appointed by him to the Politburo, set out the guidelines for the change in theory
in a report published in Pravda, April 18, 1987: Our task today ". . . involves enriching
Marxist thought at a qualitatively new stage of world development and constantly renewing
and upgrading our world outlook . . . Lenin . . . summarized . . . natural sciences at the
beginning of the century. It is our duty to collectively develop Marxist-Leninist teaching
just as dynamically, keeping in mind that the amount of information available now doubles
every 20 months as opposed to 50 years in K. Marx's times. . . We need to be aware that no
one has a monopoly on truth in either raising new questions or finding answers."
14. Following Khruschev's speech to the Central Committee in 1956 attacking Stalin
and his brutality, a democratic Hungarian regime declared itself independent of the Warsaw
Pact. And after duplicitous reassurances from Russia, Hungary's efforts to achieve freedom
were snuffed out by Soviet tanks and troops sent in to overthrow the new government and
to quell the rebellion. See BARRON, supra note 10, at 7. Likewise in 1953 following Stalin's
death, riots occurred in East Germany.
15. Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great are accused of personally eliminating political
enemies. Czar Paul I, son of Catherine the Great, was assassinated in 1801 in favor of his
son Alexander I when he displeased the ruling Boyar class. In 1825 the Decembrists (a revo-
lutionary group opposed to the harsh policies of Czar Alexander I and his brother and suc-
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posed by secret police and slaughter of kulaks and appropriation of their
farms, Stalin created his socialist-industrial dictatorship. 6
Changes as fundamental as those proposed by Gorbachev, while not
portending the terror or bloodshed of earlier eras, do carry with them
severe risks to the Soviet regime itself; among them are loss of Marxism-
Leninism, loss of moral power among Soviet citizens, and loss of control
over the Socialist world. 7
B. Gorbachev's Call For Change
1. Generally
Gorbachev was a known reformer when he assumed office in March,
1985. Under the tutelage of Yuri Andropov among others, his rise from
humble beginnings in Stavropol at the base of the Caucasus Mountains,
to Moscow and the Politburo was swift."8 Following Brezhnev's death in
cessor Nicholas I), were caught and executed or exiled in accordance with the degree of their
participation. In 1905 the palace guards of Nicholas II massacred peacefully petitioning citi-
zens led by Father Gapon to the Winter Palace in Leningrad. The ensuing uproar finally led
Nicholas to create the First Duma, an advisory legislative body. The Duma was in turn
abolished (1918) by the Bolsheviks through armed threat, following the abdication of
Nicholas II in 1917. See generally B. PARES, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA (1965).
16. So pervasive was the use of mass terror to accomplish reform, particularly during
the Stalin era, that by some estimates some 20 million innocent Soviet citizens were annihi-
lated in prisons and forced labor camps. See W. CORSON & R. CROWLEY, THE NEW
KGB-ENGINE OF SOVIET POWER 41 (1986). Stalin is alleged to have said "One man's death
is a tragedy; 10,000 deaths is merely a statistic." Id. Alexandre I. Solzhenitsyn confirmed the
brutality in THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO 435-439 (1973). Based on reports of prisoners who
presumably witnessed the events or were in a position to develop accurate information,
Solzhenitsyn estimates that in the 16 month period between June, 1918 and October 1919,
more than 16,000 persons were shot (more than 1,000 per month, compared to about 10
executions per month during the peak years of the Inquisition in Spain (1420-1498) by
burning at the stake. During the period of NKVD chief Yezhov's purges of 1937-1938, exe-
cution by shooting increased to more than 500,000 political prisoners, plus 480,000 habitual
thieves. According to other Solzhenitsyn sources, 1,700,000 condemned prisoners had been
shot by 1939.
17. A realist, Gorbachev is said to have proclaimed to visiting rulers of the Communist
satellites during the recent 1987 November Communist celebration that Moscow is no
longer the center for world communism and that each communist country is on its own and
must tailor its own policy. China, Yugoslavia and Rumania, have been following such a
course for some time. While Polish leader Wojciech Jaruzelski has become an ideological
ally of Gorbachev, hardline leader Erich Honecker of East Germany and Gustav Husak of
Czechoslovakia are lukewarm, and Rumania's Nicolae Ceausescu is clearly opposed to
Gorbachev's new ideas. The Hungarians under Janos Kadar experimented with their econ-
omy for two decades. See Szulc, How East Europeans View Gorbachev's Reforms, San
Francisco Chron., August 12, 1987, at C-5.
18. See generally SCHMIDT-HAUER, supra note 2. Under Andropov's wing Gorbachev
became a candidate member of the Politburo in 1979, and a year later became a full mem-
ber, six months before his 50th birthday. This rapid ascension was startling in view of the
fact that the average age of Politburo members at that time was over 70. See generally
Breslauer, The Nature of Soviet Politics and the Gorbachev Leadership, in THE GORBACHEV
ERA: THE PORTABLE STANFORD 11-29 (Dallin & Rice eds. 1986).
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1982, Andropov was elected his successor, but soon fell ill. Gorbachev, as
his crowned prince, appeared to independently take over Andropov's du-
ties during his illness in order to continue the momentum for reform, par-
ticularly against alcoholism 9 and corruption, started by Andropov. 0
When Andropov died on February 9, 1984, there was speculation that
Gorbachev might become his successor. The old guard, however, had been
alarmed by the Andropov reforms, and felt the pace of change should be
slowed. It felt safer with Chernenko, who was too old and frail even at
that time to make any dramatic changes.2 ' As a result of the wholesale
sacking of Party officials in Andropov's campaign against corruption, the
old guard and its proteges where frightened and anxious about their ten-
ure, privileges, and benefits. 2 In addition it feared that any sudden
changes might lead to loss of control, a weakening of planning, and a host
of other unpredictable consequences if Gorbachev were allowed to assume
power at that time.28 To credit his political skills,' Gorbachev was willing
to make a deal with the older generation and wait a while longer, until
Chernenko finally died on March 10, 1985 of complications resulting from
emphysema.
2 1
19. Alcoholism, always a serious social problem in Russia, seemed to become worse as
workers faced increasing hopelessness of bettering their lot through increased personal ef-
forts. BARRON, supra note 10, at 12. It has been estimated that as many as 40 million Soviet
citizens are alcoholics. US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Oct. 19, 1987, at 36. Murray Feshbach
of Georgetown University estimates that urban families in the Soviet Union spend nearly
the same proportion of their weekly budget on alcohol as American families do for food.
Gorbachev was shocked to learn that government tax returns on liquor sales grew to 169
billion rubles (about $253 billion) in the 11th five year plan period, from only 67 billion
rubles in the 8th five year plan. Moscow News Supp. No. 27, p. 7. Also it was reported
recently in the Soviet press, that the government battle against alcoholism has extended to
a crackdown on illegal home distilling of moonshine. San Francisco Chron., supra note 17, at
91.
20. SCHMIDT-HAUER, supra note 2, at 91; BARRON, supra note 10 at 18, gives examples
of wide-spread corruption. In one case, local newspapers in January, 1983 reported the trial
of Stanislav Ivanov and 14 conspirators who allegedly embezzled millions of rubles by regis-
tering a nonexistent factory and collecting wages for 515 phantom employees over a three
year period. Bribes and kickbacks kept officials quiet. Id. at 21.
21. According to Harvard professor Richard Pipes, the Soviet leadership and the party
evolved into a self serving privileged class which became parasitic and "Corrupted by privi-
lege and peculation, it [had] lost, since Stalin's death, any sense of service or obligation,
whether to the ideal of communism or to the nation; it so [dreaded] any change in the
Stalinist system, from which its power and privilege largely derive, that it [chose] ever
weaker secretaries as Party leaders."Pipes, supra note 12, at 49-50.
22. See US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Oct. 19, 1987, at 36.
23. As it turned out, some of their worst fears were soon to be realized.
24. Zdenek Mlynar, a Czechoslovak Communist and law school classmate of
Gorbachev's in the early 1950's regards him as a person with great political skill to have
survived the Brezhnev years while still retaining his independence and outspokenness. Said
Mlynar: "If he could live under Brezhnev for 18 years with these exceptional ideas and then
come to the top, that's proof that he is a man who knows what steps he can afford to take."
San Francisco Chron., Nov. 7, 1987.
25. SCHMIDT-HAUER, supra note 2, at 97. At the time of Chernenko's death, three of the
ten Politburo members were away from Moscow. The remaining members gathered together
1988
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Moving quickly on his agenda for reform, before the end of 1985,
Gorbachev had removed 16 of the Soviet Union's 64 ministers and had
replaced about 20 percent of all local Party officials. Four months after
his ascension, his champion Gromyko was moved out of the foreign minis-
try and pushed upstairs to become Head of State. His rivals Grishin and
Romanov were quickly forced into retirement. Truly, he was demonstrat-
ing his passion for restructuring and "his teeth of iron," so aptly de-
scribed by Gromyko.ss
The principal outline of Gorbachev's proposals for economic reform
began to emerge almost immediately following his ascension in speeches
before the Central Committee and to various interest groups within and
from outside the Soviet Union.
27
2. Speech to the Central Committee, June, 1987
In a major address to the Central Committee on June 25, 1987,
Gorbachev provided the details of his economic proposals, and sought
and received Committee approval for his extensive program.2" He out-
lined his proposals as follows: 9
a. Outline of Proposals
1) Factories and amalgamations are to be given substantially greater
independence, and will
a) be converted to full profit and loss accounting,
b) become self-financing, and
c) have increased responsibility for end results, including direct link-
at about 10:30 PM, less than three hours after he had died. Gorbachev's leading opponent
Grigori Romanov of Leningrad proposed Viktor Grishin, the 70 year old party chief of Mos-
cow, as the new General Secretary. But Foreign Minister Gromyko countered by success-
fully arguing in favor of Gorbachev, to be seconded by KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov. The
next day with only 200 of 300 representatives of the Central Committee Plenum in attend-
ance, the Politburo choice of Gorbachev was ratified. At the party Plenum, Gromyko de-
scribed Gorbachev as a man with a nice smile, but "he has teeth of iron." After his election,
opposition to Gorbachev collapsed. Id. at 112-114.
26. Id. at 114, 115, 120.
27. On January 27 and 28, 1987, at a plenary session of the Central Committee,
Gorbachev delivered a report on the draft U.S.S.R. Law on the State Enterprise. Copies of
the draft had previously been circulated among committee members for review. During his
report Gorbachev noted that the April, 1985 session of the Committee had initiated restruc-
turing. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4, Feb. 25, 1987, at 1, 2.
Steps toward reform were discussed with U.S. Congressional leaders in Moscow on April 15,
1987. See Pravda, April 16, 1987.
28. Moscow NEws, No. 28 (Supp. 1987) (hereinafter MN Supp. No. 28). The
Gorbachev address was printed in Pravda on June 27, 1987. Virtually all statements in this
section have been drawn from the Gorbachev speeches delivered to the Central Committee,
whether or not specifically documented, and represent Gorbachev's characterizations of the
state of the Soviet economy, and proposed solutions. These statements take on significance
in that they were endorsed by the Central Committee and were delivered to party members,
rather than being generated for propaganda purposes for the western press.
29. Moscow NEWS, No. 27 (Supp. 1987) at 8 (hereinafter MN Supp. No. 27).
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ing of income to work performance
2) Centralized command and control will be radically reduced.
a) Central planning bodies are not to interfere in the day-to-day activ-
ities of subordinate economic units.
b) Management is to become more democratic and self administering.
3) Planning, pricing, financing and crediting will be reformed,
including
a) transition to wholesale trade, and
b) reorganization of foreign economic activities.
b. Justification For Program- Weakened Economy
To justify the radical new programs to his comrades on the Central
Committee, Gorbachev painted a rather grim picture of the Soviet econ-
omy. Restructuring is necessary, he said, because of accumulating contra-
dictions in the development of Soviet society. Such contradictions, which
have remained unsolved, have assumed "pre-crisis forms."3 0The Soviet
economy as it entered the 1980's was in a state of virtual stagnation.3'
This dire state of affairs, brought tension and turmoil in national
finances."2
Production growth assignments were not met, according to
Gorbachev, during the past 3 five year plans. Wages substantially ex-
ceeded plan budgets. Due to shortages of everything-metal, fuel, cement,
machinery and consumer goods, together with a chronic shortage of man-
power,"3-it became clear that the economy would not be able to develop
30. Id., at 1. Quotations are from and references are to the speech reported in Supp.
No. 27, unless otherwise stated.
31. "We began to concede one position after another, and the gap in production effi-
ciency, output, quality and in technology as compared with the most developed countries
began to widen." "The desire to shore up declining growth rates by extensive methods
brought exorbitant outlays for the fuel and energy branches and the hasty commitment of
new natural resources to production, their irrational use, an excessive growth in demand for
additional labour, and an acute shortage thereof in the national economy, with a decline in
the out-put-per-asset ratio." Id. at 7.
Gorbachev's assessments are generally consistent with statistics derived from Western
intelligence sources. Although Soviet per capita consumption nearly tripled between 1950
and 1970, it was only about one third the U.S. level, and less than half that of France and
Germany in the late 1970's. Soviet per capita consumption growth rates averaged about
3.4% annually from 1950, but slowed to less than 2% in 1981, and to under 1% in 1982. See
G. SCHROEDER, SOVIET LIVING STANDARDS: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 367, 368; SoVIET
ECONOMY IN THE 1980's: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, Part 2, Selected Papers (Joint Economic
Committee, Congress of the United States, December 31, 1982) cited as Joint Economic
Committee. Despite periodic shortages of food throughout the Soviet Union, roughly 25% of
its labor force is employed in agriculture. By contrast, the U.S. so employs only 3.4% of its
labor force, yet has a continuing problem of excess production. BARRON, supra note 10, at
12, 13.
32. "Outwardly everything looked fine" (in the State budget). But the budget was bal-
anced not by increasing economic efficiency but by extensive selling of oil and other fuel and
raw material resources on the world market. MN Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 7.
33. Labor shortages are likely to become more acute in the future. Between 1964 and
1980, the mortality rate in the Soviet Union increased almost 50% from 6.9 deaths to 10.3
1988
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normally. The housing industry failed to meet demands,"' as had indus-
tries producing consumer goods.35 Gorbachev admitted that a shadow
economy had emerged to provide for unmet consumer services."'
He expressed alarm that the U.S.S.R. had begun to lag in scientific
and technical development during a period when Western countries had
begun large-scale restructuring of their own economies. He confirmed
that economic incentives necessary to raise quality and efficiency were
not operating, and that this created fuel for inflation. Furthermore, hard
currency earned from exports of oil and raw materials is not being used to
modernize the economy, but to meet current needs. The Soviet economy
is so bad, conceded Gorbachev, that revolutionary in-depth transforma-
tions are needed to get it out of the pre-crisis situation it is in.
Present management difficulties, he said, stem from the Stalin era,
when the U.S.S.R. was attempting to pull its backward economy forward
in the face of isolation from the capitalist world.37 Dramatic strides in
industrialization were made during the Stalin period."8 Following adop-
deaths annually per 1000 people, due primarily to poor medical care. Barron, supra note 10,
at 10. In the past, Communist leaders had been able to show increases of production by
adding more workers to the work force. However, recently declining population, particularly
among the northern Russians, has deprived the economy of important necessary motive
power which can be replaced only through innovation, efficiency and new technology. See
Urban, Perestroika versus Oblomov, The Times (London), July 23, 1987.
34. Notwithstanding a housing shortage, Gorbachev asserts that there is unused hous-
ing construction capacity of about 20% in the country. Brickyards and building materials
plants, he says, should be operated continuously and not be operated on half day shifts nor
shut down on weekends.
35. "We need ... more goods of better quality and wider range ... service standards
are low ... there are many queues because the number of shops is . . . insufficient" MN
Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 7. Studies conducted in 1982 found that a typical Moscow
worker must labor 53.5 hours to provide a family of 4 with basic groceries needed for a week,
while comparable work time in Washington would be 18.6 hours, and in London, 24.7 hours.
BARRON, supra note 10, at 12. These figures cited by Barron are slightly misleading because
of government subsidies and the relative cost of housing, utilities and recreation for Soviet
citizens is substantially lower than comparable costs in the West.
36. The Central Statistical Board estimates that 1.5 billion rubles (about $2.25 billion)
is paid annually by Soviet citizens for such services in the shadow economy. "Let us call a
spade a spade and stop feigning innocence. Individual enterprise has always existed in our
economy. Illicit, underground, the black economy, call it what you like .... This phenome-
non has assumed a mass scale. We are not introducing individual enterprise, we are just
giving this practice civilized and organized forms . . . We are legalizing individual enter-
prise, and introducing a system of taxation and elements of planning to it." Interview with
Lionid Abalkin, Director of the Institute of Economics at the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences,
in New Times (Moscow), July 20, 1987 at 3.
See H. SMITH, THE RUSSIANS 106-134 (1976) for a very readable account of how the
shadow or counter economy works.
37. "The foundations for the present system of management were laid down ... in the
1930's. In that difficult period our country, which was far from the most developed economi-
cally and which was up against the whole capitalist world, needed to rapidly overcome the
technic-economic lag and to bring about quick structural changes in the national economy."
MN Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 7.
38. Gorbachev states that in the pre World War II period, gross industrial output grew
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tion of the five-year plans beginning in 1928, the number of industrial
workers tripled over the next twelve pre-war years. Sixty percent of the
national income was redistributed through the State budget. Great re-
sources were channeled into heavy industry. A highly centralized, rigid,
over-regimented management system was devised to direct these changes
in the economy. Such a system permitted the Soviet Union, according to
Gorbachev, to achieve strategic tasks which took capitalist countries de-
cades to achieve. But, over the years this system has clashed with the
requirements of modern economics including the technological revolution,
emphasis on quality and the consequence of social conditions. Although
since the 1950's attempts to change the management system were made,
such efforts were short lived.3 9 The prevailing system thus continued to
stifle rather than to stimulate the economy.
c. Proposed Solutions and Benefits of Changes
The solution to the problem, according to Gorbachev, is more social-
ism combined with greater democracy. What we are planning, he said,
does not weaken socialism, but rather will strengthen it, and remove bar-
riers holding it back. 0 The most difficult challenge, is to create under
socialism more powerful stimuli than those of capitalism, which will pro-
mote economic, scientific, technological and social progress. In addition,
Soviets must learn how best to blend planned guidance with the interests
of the individual and society.
The worker must become the real master of the workplace."1 Income
6.5 times and the Soviet Union moved from fourth to first place in Europe and to second in
the world.
39. The seeds of change were beginning to be sown upon the death of Stalin. Khruschev
made efforts to revitalize the economy, boasting to then Vice President Nixon in the late
1950's at a Moscow trade fair: "We will bury you." Khruschev instituted a disastrous effort
to improve grain harvests through a "virgin lands" policy by plowing up new lands which
added little to grain production.. FODOR'S SovIET UNION 1985 103 (1984). He attempted
other reforms but without sufficient political skills, stepped on too many toes and in 1964
was deposed. See also US NEws AND WORLD REPORT, supra note 20, at 42. Andropov, upon
the death of Brezhnev in 1982, made a determined effort to crack down on bureaucratic
corruption and alcoholism, but died too soon to effect any substantial changes. Chernenko
was too frail and old to initiate any major reforms before his death in March 1985, little
more than a year after taking the helm of the Soviet Communist Party.
40. The changes will bring out the immense potential of socialism and "lend it the most
modern forms. . .socialism should not be seen as an ossified, unchanging system, or the
practical work to refine it as a means of adjusting complex reality to fit ideas, notions and
formulas adopted once and for all." "We should strive after Lenin's ability to creatively
develop the theory and practice of building socialism, adopt scientific methods..." MN
Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 8.
41. [This] "means giving collectives and individual workers broad possibilities to man-
age public property and increase their accountability for how efficiently it is used." ".. •
man with his real interests and motives is central to our economic policy..." "We must
realize that the time when management consisted of orders, bans and calls has gone . . .
such methods can no longer be employed for they are simply ineffective." Id. at 8. Under
the new enterprise law ". . . the actual pay of every worker [should] be closely linked to his
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of working people should be geared to individual performance. The crite-
rion for performance and material rewards should be whether the enter-
prise will help meet peoples' vital needs and help eliminate the shadow
economy.
Under the new price and credit system, the market is to be "won and
controlled in accordance with its laws. . ." Competition is central to acti-
vating the forces of socialism. There should be competition between gov-
ernment-run and cooperative factories. The winners should be rewarded
with tangible economic benefits. This, he said, "is in line with the princi-
ples of socialism. . . ." There should also be competition in science and
technological development.
4 2
Gorbachev noted that the present Soviet economic system has suf-
fered from an inherent' weakness of internal stimuli for the proper devel-
opment of the enterprise.43 Under the new program, the factory itself,
guided by public requirements, will draw up its own production and mar-
keting plans. The plan will not be based on detailed targets handed down
by superior agencies, but rather on commercial orders placed by state
agencies, by enterprises operating on a self-supporting basis, and by trad-
ing establishments. Factories should compete economically to meet con-
sumer demand and state contract orders should be awarded, as a rule, on
a competitive basis.
Planning target figures should serve as a guide to the factory regard-
ing the social need for products. Such figures should not serve as direc-
tives and thus shackle the work collective in drafting its plans.
Factories should pay their own way. From their own revenues and
profits, they should cover their current expenses, including wages and sal-
ary, make investments for modernization and increased capacity, and pay
for social amenities for their collectives. State budget funding will only be
used for important state tasks. Factories will be allowed to draw bank
credits. They will make payments to the state for interest on credits,
land, water, manpower and other basic resources. Supplies to factories
will no longer be provided by central authorities but rather from whole-
sale trade, to be paid for from earnings. Work collectives individually
should determine all production matters at their factories, including elec-
tion of their top managers.
personal contribution to the end result, and that no limit be set. There is only one criterion
of justice: whether or not it is honestly earned." Id. at 11.
42. ". . . Experience has convinced us that monopoly for individual organizations is a
serious drag on scientific and technological progress..." Id. at 8.
43. "A factory is given production quotas and resources through a system of directive-
like indices. Virtually all costs are covered and the marketing of products is effectively guar-
anteed. . . workers' incomes are connected poorly with the end result of work. . . (In this
situation) manufacturers find it disadvantageous to use cheap. . . materials and unprofita-
ble to improve product quality and apply research innovation. Under such an economic
mechanism, the line between effective and systematically lagging enterprises is virtually
erased." Id. at 8.
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Gorbachev recognized that excess labor will be a necessary by-prod-
uct of the changes, particularly with the resulting scientific and techno-
logical progress." Part of the surplus labor forces will be absorbed into
expanded public service, education, medicare, recreational and cultural
jobs to be created. The dislocations must be handled with due regard for
workers' rights.4
He also touched on the critical problem of bankruptcy." If a factory
has been mismanaged and cannot make guaranteed payments to the state
or payments for labor, aid can be provided initially from a bank or the
industrial branch of which the failing enterprise is a part. If there is no
improvement, the enterprise can be reorganized or terminated; in such
circumstances, the state should help dismissed workers find new jobs.
d. Providing A Theoretical Base For Changes
Gorbachev recognized the need for a solid theoretical underpinning
to his bold initiatives, to keep at bay his detractors who would argue that
he was abandoning the precepts of the fathers of Socialism. Both Marx
and Lenin, said Gorbachev, had early practical experiences in analyzing
the problems of society and in developing theories for building socialism,
but over the years basic socialist principles have been oversimplified and
corrupted, and this has resulted in negative influences on the Soviet
economy.
4"
Management of the economy has mistakenly been attempted by de-
cree and resort to enthusiasm 49 , Gorbachev asserted, we have tended to
44. It is anticipated that some 16 million workers might be displaced by the end of the
century. US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, supra note 19, at 38.
45. We must pay close attention to the rearrangements, and "... ensure social guaran-
tees for employment of the working people, for their constitutional right to work." MN
Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 9. It was reported that the Politburo has approved plans for
a government-run placement service and for greater unemployment benefits to ease the
shock of job losses expected under the economic reforms. About half of all government min-
istry jobs are to be terminated by 1990. San Francisco Chron., Nov. 20, 1987, at A31.
46. According to recent Pravda reports, 13 percent of Soviet state-owned businesses are
unprofitable and may be closed under the new economic reforms. San Francisco Chron.,
Aug. 20, 1987, at 14.
47. We need a "real breakthrough on the theoretical front . . . a scientific substantia-
tion of the aims and prospects of our movement." MN Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 2.
48. "[Our] task now is to make a profound analysis of the practice of socialist develop-
ment, the wealth of experience accumulated by us." In making "the transition to full profit-
and-loss accounting, to remunerate according to the end result" the socialist principle of
"from each according to his abilities, to each according to his work" was often sacrificed in
the name of a simplified concept of equality. "Equality does not mean levelling off" (i.e.
paying similar wages to all). This, states Gorbachev, has " generated sponging, negatively
influenced the quality and quantity of work and reduced incentives to increase productiv-
ity". Id. at 2-3.
49. The Central Committee annually promulgates slogans to be used for May Day cele-
brations to whip up enthusiasm among Soviet citizens for party programs. Some of those
promulgated for May Day, 1987, are as follows: "Toilers of the Land of Soviets! More
broadly develop competition. . .Communists! Be in the vanguard of restructuring. . .Ex-
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forget about Lenin's precepts that the growth of production can be en-
sured on the basis of personal interest" and material incentives. To
demonstrate the validity of the gospel he was propounding, he lauded
new, capitalistic family contracts that were initiated to help boost agricul-
tural production.5 ' Advantages of the contract system, utilizing small un-
used plots, are substantially lower costs and higher production, all of
which benefit the community generally.
Although his reforms sound very capitalistic, 2 he does not see these
new procedures as contradicting or corrupting socialism.5 3 Socialism he
said, is a system of working people for working people, which provides a
high degree of social protection to the Soviet citizen. Work, and work
alone should be the basis of a person's material and moral standing in
socialist society. "Every encouragement should be given to creative,
highly productive work, to talent, to real contribution to the common
pand Soviet democracy and the Socialist self-government of the people!" The Current Di-
gest of the Soviet Press, XXXIX No. 17 (May 27, 1987).
50. "[U]nshackled grass roots initiative and departure from over-organization and from
excessive reliance on centralized management make it possible, with the same resources, to
achieve a breakthrough in increasing food stocks." MN Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 5.
He cites an example of workers on a farm collective in the Novosibirsk region of Siberia who
say they were attracted "not only by high wages, but, in no lesser degree, independence,
realization of their human significance, and pride that they are doing really useful work."
MN Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 4.
51. He described a contract in which A. A. Volochensky, a state farm machinery opera-
tor is assigned 40 hectares of land, some calves and feed, and with the help of his family of
four will produce 11 tons of meat. After reimbursing the state farm 23,000 rubles for rent,
seed, fuel and other resources, the family business will retain wages (profit) of 8,000 rubles,
about $12,000. This spare time return is substantial considering that the average Soviet
citizen earns 200 rubles (about $300) per month ($3600 per year) at his regular job. Thus in
comrade Volochensky's case, since both he and his wife work at the state farm and presuma-
bly earn about $7,200 annually between them, and with the help of their two children, who
are students, they can more than double their family yearly income by their spare time
livestock business. In another calf producing operation by a small group of workers, the
average monthly wage per team member was 534 rubles (about $800) per month.
"Gorbachev responds . . there is nothing wrong with that because the money is for work,
for real products. Let me ask: has this undermined the collective farm system? No it
hasn't. .. So this is nothing other than socialism, effective, creative and labour-minded." Id.
at 4-5.
52. Soviet economist Leonid Abalkin in the New Times interview, supra note 36, was
asked whether capitalism and socialism were converging under the new economic program.
He stated: ". . . there exist certain universal forms of social and economic progress ..
without competition any advance is unthinkable . . .the economy must be geared to the
needs of the consumer..." It is on the producer's ". . . ability to meet consumer demand
that the income of a self-supporting factory, the earnings of its collective and social welfare
funds depend. What is this: capitalist competition or a manifestation of certain universal
economic laws?. . .The difference between our society and capitalism lies not in the form,
but in the social and class essence of production relations. What really matters is who reigns
supreme in the country, who owns the means of production. I see no convergence here . .
As for the forms, we ought to adopt the best of them." Id. at 5.
53. "Rather, the old practice, when negligence in work was paid from the budget, cor-





Democratization, according to Gorbachev, is the key to successful re-
structuring; this is in accordance with Leninist principles.5 5 Revitalization
cannot be successful without massive support of Soviet citizens. This in
turn, can be achieved only through a general democratization of society."
Democratization in all spheres of life is expanding; it includes a cultural
revival, and extends to science, literature and art. Soviet citizens are more
keenly interested in the ethical problems of their society and want to
know more about their country's past,57 present and future. As a conse-
quence of these positive changes in attitude, labor productivity and in-
dustrial output have increased noticeably during the last two years. De-
mocratization affects all aspects of Soviet life. Soviet citizens "[n]o longer
want decisions related to their interests to be taken without their partici-
pation, no matter who takes them." Party committees and state authori-
ties must stay constantly in touch with public opinion and use it to verify
decisions that they are about to make.
He recognizes that the new democratic procedure will not be easy for
everybody."8 Gorbachev sees democracy as a way of holding the feet of
54. Perhaps in preparation for his speech on revitalizing the Soviet economy,
Gorbachev and his advisors read T. PETERS & R. WATERMAN, IN SEARCH OF EXCEL-
LENCE-LESSONS FROM AMERICA'S BEST-RUN COMPANIES 14 (1982). Among the authors' find-
ings is that the most productive and profitable companies foster autonomy and entrepre-
neurship. One of the successful companies, 3M, was described as "so intent on innovation
that its essential atmosphere seems not like that of a large corporation but rather a loose
network of laboratories and cubbyholes populated by feverish inventors and dauntless en-
trepreneurs who let their imaginations fly in all directions. . .They encourage practical risk
taking, and support good tries." Id. For a capitalistic view of factors leading to the renewal
of business organizations, compare R. WATERMAN, THE RENEWAL FACTOR (1987).
55. Democracy according to Gorbachev, appears to be involvement of the masses in the
decision making process, not necessarily through voting as we in the west think of it. Quot-
ing Lenin, he says: "The more profound the change we wish to bring about, the more we
must rouse an interest in and an intelligent attitude towards it, and convince more millions
and tens of millions of people that it is necessary." MN Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 6.
56. "Comrades, I want to stress once again that our economic work, the reorganization
in the national economy can be successful only if [it] attract[s] millions of working people.
So it can be said that our course of fundamentally restructuring management actually
merges with the course of further democratization and not only of economic life, but of the
entire life of society. Progress in the economy and development of socialist democratization
are indivisible." Id. at 7.
57. Gorbachev has laid the foundation for a correction of Soviet history books which
had been tampered with, particularly during the Stalin years: ". . . there should be no for-
gotten names or blank spots in either history or literature. Otherwise, what we have is not
history and literature but artificial, opportunistic constructs. . .The Party has spoken about
the painful matters. We do not intend to portray them in a rosy light today. . .History must
be seen as it is. Everything happened, there were mistakes-grave mistakes-but the coun-
try moved forward." Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XXXIX, No. 7 (1987) at 7.
58. "Some have difficulties with openness; others find it hard to accept criticism and
unfavorable press reports, still others have come to believe that only their own opinion is
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wayward public officials to the fire in order to bring about desired
changes in the bureaucracy."
He has made some bold pronouncements concerning the virtue of un-
fettered debate in a democratic society, and the need for changes in the
Party control mechanism. 0 Though recent events demonstrate that there
are limits to democratic expression in the Soviet Union," and that the
Party leaders are still feeling their way through the minefields of glasnost.
f. Planning
Gorbachev foresees a radical reformation of central planning in the
Soviet Union. 2 He anticipates a greater role for economic contracts be-
tween enterprises to balance the economy." The national economic plan
should define basic priorities and objectives for the country's socio-eco-
nomic development, trends in investment policy and targets for scientific,
educational, cultural and defense capability. The plan should provide
targets for the ministries and the republics and, over a 15 year period,
should balance all major programs. Yearly goals should be set in the five-
year plans.6 4
g. Pricing
Radical reform in pricing is contemplated. According to Gorbachev,
'infallible?'" MN Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 6.
59. Such officials "understand perfectly well that they can talk their way out of it when
brought to account by their superiors, but the people will hold them responsible in full
measure." Id.
60. "To live and work in conditions of extended democracy means to have no fear of
debates and of the collision of views and positions. All this is natural and essential in the
quest for truth..." Under the new democracy, control mechanisms must change. Without
giving up the predominant guiding role of the Party in Soviet society "We should master in
full the Leninist principle of socialist control combining broad democratization with Party
guidance. We regard people's inspection both as an efficient tool for detecting new issues
which demand urgent solution and as one of the most important forms of bringing the
masses into the process of self government, into running the affairs of society and the
State." Id.
61. Particularly the highly publicized demotion of one of Gorbachev's supporters, Boris
Yeltsin, former Party boss of Moscow for his outbursts at a Party gathering in which he
decried the slow pace of restructuring. See San Francisco Chron., November 14, 1987. For
overstepping the boundaries of glasnost in his enthusiasm to push reforms, Yeltsin was
given a public dressing down by party leaders, led by Gorbachev himself, and the proceed-
ings were given full coverage by the Soviet press. Tiaa, Nov. 23, 1987, at 34.
62. "It is an illusion to think that everything can be foreseen from the centre within the
framework of such a huge economy as ours." MN Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 9.
63. The new "genuinely democratic centralism as Lenin understood it... possesses a
far greater potential than centralism thorned by attempts to regulate all and everything."
Id.
64. This planning process appears to be moving more closely toward our own in the
United States where the President and Congress establish national long term goals through
various legislative pronouncements, and then as a part of the budgeting process, particularly
in military procurement, provide for expenditures over a multi-year period.
VOL. 16:2,3
GORBACHEV REVOLUTION
price must be an important stimulus for lowering costs, improving use of
resources product quality, and in speeding up technological progress.
Pricing has been geared to cheap natural resources. Existing low prices of
coal, gas, oil and electricity keep an illusion of inexhaustibility of natural
resources and promote increased production, consumption and export.
Low pricing has resulted in rapid growth of subsidies. 65 Poor pricing has
provided an unjustifiably high level of profit for many goods and does not
contribute to efficient production. Those who understate prices have no
incentive to increase output.
Pricing must be radically reformed to interconnect the entire price
system-wholesale, purchase and retail prices together with tariffs. The
price of the most important products must be centrally set as a part of
the state plan. But the sphere of contract prices must be widened to pro-
mote economic independence. Wholesale price reform must promote
higher production efficiency, resource savings and quality. Much work
and discussion must ensue before the price system can be reformed and
the new five year plan is prepared."
h. Wholesale Trade
Wholesale trade will become more dependent upon direct contacts
between suppliers and consumers, with the state playing only a regulatory
role. The present system is wasteful and results in large stocks of com-
modities being stored. Wholesale trade would normalize stocks.' 7
i. Finance and Crediting
Gorbachev observed that the national economy is oversaturated with
money's and that monetary funds are thus divorced from movement of
material values. The ruble therefore does not fulfill its role of active fi-
nancial control over the economy." Cooperatives should be established to
65. It has been estimated that to keep rents at 1928 levels and meat prices at those
prevailing in 1964, the government must now pay annual subsidies of some $115 billion. US
NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, supra note 19, at 38.
66. Soviet citizens have displayed anxiety about potential price reforms. For many
years they have been used too low, highly subsidized basic commodities, not to mention
housing and utilities. US NEws AND WORLD REPORT, Oct. 19, 1987, at 37 As Gorbachev has
observed however, the failure of the Soviets to permit the market to regulate prices has
brought about shortages and waste. Polish citizens, socialist neighbors of the Soviets, are
alarmed over the prospect of price reform in their country, fearing that price increases con-
templated by the government may be beyond many family budgets. San Francisco Chron.,
Nov. 16, 1987.
67. There are complaints about shortages. However stockpiles of metals grow, observes
Gorbachev. The surplus stocks are scattered around the economy. "Therefore the sooner we
establish direct ties and embark on wholesale trade, the quicker we shall get rid of shortages
in supply and of surplus stocks. . ." MN Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 10.
68. Excess money supply developed from 1971 through 1985, when the volume of
money in circulation grew 3.1 times while consumer goods production only doubled.
69. "The national financial system has grown largely out dated." MN Supp. No. 27,
supra note 29, at 10.
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provide public services, and Soviet citizens should invest surplus funds in
such enterprises. In addition, personal funds should be used to finance




Gorbachev recognized that because of the vast size of the Soviet
economy and the increasing interdependence of world economies, the So-
viet union is increasingly linked economically to the outside world. The
U.S.S.R. must deepen its participation in the international division of la-
bor. External ties will impact the quality of Soviet products and the sci-
entific and technological progress of Soviet industries through increased
competition with world class products and technology transfers. In addi-
tion, Gorbachev foresees that restructuring will increase the integration of
Soviet industries with those of other socialist countries.
7 1
k. Organization of Amalgamations and Enterprises
New forms of business organization should be permitted to increase
the efficiency of the economy. Labor has been wasted by irrational organi-
zation and lack of specialization. Switching to profit and loss accounting
must be combined with allowing enterprises to form joint ventures and to
provide for shareholding. Mergers should be permitted if dictated by eco-
nomic expediency. Under the contemplated new conditions, enterprises
can be expected to form all sorts of new organizations such as computing
centers, social and environmental protection facilities, and transport and
training schools.
Presently 37,000 industrial enterprises are controlled by the state
plan, directly from the center.7s The ministries should be relieved of oper-
ational economic management and concentrate instead on broad stimula-
70. To some extent private savings are already being tapped to provide housing, partic-
ularly in instances where parents wish to assist their newly married children. Increasingly,
Gorbachev's recommendations as to how citizens should utilize their savings would seem to
open up vast possibilities of investment akin to capitalistic stock or bond holding. Perhaps
socialist principles can remain untarnished if the government controls the amount of return
payable for the use of capital. Such control however, would quite often be authorizing a
subsidy for the user of the capital if he borrows below what would otherwise be market
rates.
71. "We must study the experience of our friends closely and profoundly, and apply
everything that can be used in the interests of the national economy of the U.S.S.R.." MN
Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 10. The Hungarians have been experimenting with capital-
ism for at least several decades. In addition, the Soviets have been closely wAtching the
economic restructuring going on in China in recent years.
It was recently reported that a U.S.-Hungarian institute will be established in Budapest
for the study of capitalistic management techniques. San Francisco Chron., Nov. 15, 1987.
72. Marshall Goldman of Harvard's Russian Research Center estimates that Gosplan,
the central planning committee which administers the economy, handles 7 million docu-
ments a year and makes 83 million calculations, most of them without the benefit of com-
puters. US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, supra note 19, at 36.
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tion of new products, achieving world standards, and promoting science
and technology. As a consequence, their large staffs can be reduced. As
the economy is restructured, the roles and functions of state ministries
will change significantly in order to help industries within their oversight
to work out new forms and mechanisms. The U.S.S.R. State Planning
Committee should concentrate on determining prospects for develop-
ment, realizing fundamental and social tasks and insuring overall balance
in the economy.
1. Implementation of the New Program
The Soviet Communist Party, with the assistance of the country's
economic managers, will be responsible for implementing the reform.
Gorbachev warned that unless managers behind restructuring are sup-
ported and those opposed are reassigned, reform will proceed with diffi-
culty. Discussion of the new procedures is to take place at all Party levels.
National progress on restructuring was reviewed at the 19th All-Union
Party conference which began June 28, 1988. The principal reforms are to
be in place as a part of the 13th, five year plan, beginning in 1991. s
In charging his communist cadres to spread the new gospel through-
out the land, Gorbachev stated that a ground swell of support by the or-
dinary citizen is essential, to be achieved by prompt tangible benefits to
the common man. 4 While tremendous hopes have been aroused, he says,
the benefits of restructuring have not yet become evident to the masses.
The Party must make sure that these hopes are effectuated by its leaders.
A principal roadblock to renewal and creativity, according to
Gorbachev, is the conservatism, inertia, and selfish interests of the bu-
reaucracy.7 As a part of his campaign to pressure recalcitrant officials to
get on-board with his program, along with encouraging the press to put
pressure on laggards7 6 and encouraging workers to participate in work-
place elections, Gorbachev has adopted a practice of publicly criticizing
responsible Party members for their failures.7 A basic problem of change
73. The June, 1987 plenary meeting of the Central Committee approved the Gorbachev
sponsored "Guidelines for Radical Restructuring of Economic Management." He had pro-
posed that they should become the Party directives for all work in that area and that the
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. adopt the "Law of the U.S.S.R. on the State Enterprise
(Amalgamation)" which he explained to the Committee in his address. Gorbachev expects
that beginning in 1988, the new principles will apply to about two thirds of all Soviet indus-
trial output and that transition to the new system will be completed by 1989.
74. "People should feel that perestroika is spreading, deepening and beginning to bear
real fruit in all spheres of life and above all in what concerns meeting daily, essential needs
of the working people." Id.
75. See US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, supra note 19 at 36, 37.
76. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, supra note 57, at 7. "The press is called upon to
be even more active, to give no rest to idlers, self-seekers, time servers and suppressors of
criticism, and to more actively help those who are fighting for restructuring." "Criticism is a
bitter pill. But the illness makes it necessary. You wince but you take it." Id. at 6.
77. Gorbachev provided examples to the Central Committee of national targets in cer-
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at local levels is the historical predisposition to wait for commands to
originate from above-a necessary side-effect of dictatorship."'
Time is running out warns Gorbachev: "That beautiful tomorrow"
may not happen if everyone does not work today by the sweat of his
brow, changing his way of thinking, overcoming inertia and accepting new
approaches.
III. SOVIET TRADE OFFENSIVE
As a part of his efforts to implement restructuring of the economy,
Gorbachev has launched a new foreign trade offensive. On December 8,
1986, some 50 top trade officials from the Soviet Union, headed by Minis-
ter of Foreign Trade Boris Aristov descended on New York City for the
annual meeting of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council. The
Russians were joined by more than 250 American businessmen, largely
chief executive officers of major American corporations interested in trad-
ing with the Soviet Union.7 9 Among the American participants was Ar-
mand Hammer, chairman of Occidental Petroleum Corporation, and Don-
ald Kendall, chairman of Pepsico. Both companies are heavily involved in
trade with the Soviet Union.
The purpose of the December meeting was to continue the dialogue
which had been initiated upon formation of the Trade and Economic
Council in 1973, but at a more intense pace. Following the Moscow sum-
mit meeting between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev in
1972, a number of accords were entered into in order to give substance to
the new detente which had developed. Among them was the creation of
the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council. Its purpose was to bring
together leading American businessmen and heads of Soviet foreign trade,
industrial, and service organizations on an annual basis. The Council
tain industries which were not met. Serious miscalculations were made, but problems could
have been foreseen and prevented. Primarily responsible were Comrade N. V. Talyzin of the
State Planning Committee and other ministers named by Gorbachev. Armenia and its party
boss Demirchyan, according to Gorbachev is showing ". . . totally unjustified tranquility"
and "no effective efforts are being made against bribery, profiteering and protectionism."
Similar problems exist in the Gorky region. In a veiled threat to improve performance,
Gorbachev states: "It may be presumed that . . . party officials there (will) . . . draw con-
clusions from the criticism and put things right." MN Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 3.
78. "Many local officials show the most deep-seated parasitic attitudes. Even in cases
when a minimum of effort and attention would be enough, officials keep shifting the burden
onto the central authorities, and waiting for assistance from those higher up. Such an atti-
tude . . . should be resolutely condemned. . ." Id. at 3. According to Arkady N.
Shevchenko, Soviet Under Secretary General of the United Nations, who defected to the
United States in the early 1980's: "Official Soviet pedagogy prescribed that independent
behavior or thinking means above all the ability to understand orders and carry them out in
the best way possible. What this means in practical terms is that any initiative which might
go beyond established limits should be viewed as dangerous and suppressed." A.
SHEVCHENKO, BREAKING WITH Moscow (1985).




seeks ways to improve trade and cooperation between the two countries
and, in so doing, facilitates the exchange of trade delegations, the conduct
of seminars and joint scientific research, participation in trade exhibi-
tions, and the conduct of joint scientific research. It also helps organize
joint ventures and promotes the exchange of technology and products.
The Council helps U.S. companies find Soviet partners and gives advice
on how to deal with Soviet counterparts."0
At the 1986 Council meeting in New York, Trade Minister Aristov
and his associates sought to capitalize on the thaw in Soviet-U.S. rela-
tions brought about by the Geneva and Reykjavik summit meetings be-
tween Gorbachev and President Reagan. They also sought to reinforce
impressions in the West that the Soviets were truly changing their de-
meanor through massive restructuring of their economy and glasnost, and
that they wanted to become full fledged members of the world commu-
nity through trade,"' including admission to GATT."'
During the course of the two days of official meetings (plus additional
days of informal meetings to permit trading companies to conclude
deals), the Soviets explained the new economic policies emanating from
80. During the 1985-86 period the Council helped conduct in the Soviet Union some 70
scientific seminars sponsored by U.S. companies concerning agriculture, oil processing and
drilling, tobacco, foodstuffs and other products. And in the same year, 16 Soviet trade dele-
gations visited the United States. Furthermore, in 1986, Soviet foreign trade organizations
and U.S. companies concluded some $1.8 billion in contracts. Id. at 34.
81. The West for many years has sought to use trade as a means of taming the Russian
bear. In 1922 British Prime Minister Lloyd George said: "I believe we can save her [Russia]
by trade. Commerce has a sobering influence... Trade, in my opinion will bring an end to
the ferocity, the rapine, and the crudity of Bolshevism surer than any other method." H.
SMITH, THE RuSSIANs 655 (1976).
82. The Journal of Commerce, supra note 79, at 25.
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) was initiated in 1947, following the
post war failure of the U.S. proposed International Trade Organization. Twenty three na-
tions met in Geneva, Switzerland and negotiated an extensive set of bilateral trade conces-
sions which they incorporated into the GATT agreements. See P. T. ELLSWORTH, THE IN-
TERNATIONAL ECONOMY 512 (1964). See also K. DAM, THE GAIT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970). Since then the signatory parties have met periodically to
negotiate additional trade concessions.
They have adopted a set of rules to protect their rights and obligations. Meetings are to
be held annually or oftener. The organization provides for a secretariat and a permanent
Council of Representatives. Among the rules are the following: 1) trade is to be conducted in
a non-discriminatory manner, 2) use of qualitative restrictions is condemned, and 3) dis-
agreements are to be resolved through consultation.
To ensure against discrimination, the parties have agreed to apply the most favored
nation principle to all import and export duties (each nation is to be treated as well as the
most favored nation). Dumping and export subsidies may be countered by measures limited
to the offending country. Customs unions or free trade areas are permitted if they do not
raise barriers to the trade of other parties. Though import quotas are not allowed, countries
confronted with balance of payments problems may use quantitative restrictions to forestall
a serious decline in reserves. In addition, underdeveloped countries may apply quantitative
restrictions to further economic development but only under GATT approved procedures.
Import restrictions are also allowed under certain other conditions relating to domestic mar-
ket controls imposed by the importing country. ELLSWORTH, supra note 82.
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the Kremlin. They also engaged in joint bi-lingual study sessions with
U.S. businessmen, their lawyers and other advisors, provided detailed dis-
cussions of the new joint venture law, and reminded Americans of the
continuing impediments to U.S.-Soviet trade. Their efforts were well
orchestrated to appeal to the sense and sensibilities of American busi-
nessmen, and their demeanor was business-like and free of propagandistic
bombast. One of the benefits the Soviets are deriving from the Council
meetings is the development of a high-powered American constituency for
easing trade barriers which exist between the two countries.8
While launching the trade offensive, the Soviets, with the help of
their American supporters, portrayed Russia as a potentially excellent
trading partner." Assuming that political and other problems can be
solved, there is no doubt that the Soviet Union represents a large, rela-
tively untapped market for American businessmen and politicians eager
to reduce the mounting foreign trade deficit."'
IV. JOINT ENTERPRISES
A. Background
Among his proposals to restructure the economy, Gorbachev has
called for new forms of economic and industrial organizations to permit
the Soviet economy to become more efficient and benefit from world tech-
nology. In order to implement this aspect of his program, the U.S.S.R.
Council of Ministers, on January 13, 1987, adopted a resolution permit-
ting the establishment of joint enterprises in the Soviet Union with capi-
83. In attendance at the meeting were not only the CEOs of major American corpora-
tions whose checkbooks and political influence are strongly felt in Washington, but also
leading officials of the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Soviet Ambassador to the United
Nations and Claiborne Pell, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the prin-
cipal dinner speaker. In April, 1988, a delegation of more than 500 U.S. business leaders,
headed by Secretary of Commerce Verity, traveled to Moscow for the annual Trade Council
meeting and were hosted at dinner in the Kremlin by Gorbachev and the Politburo.
84. Considerable expansion of the Soviet economy is anticipated in the current 12th
five year plan. Much of the expansion will require imports from abroad. Stressed will be the
development of scientific and technological products in the areas of electronics, comprehen-
sive automation, biotechnology, and nuclear power generation, as well as the development of
raw materials. Computer hardware and software capacity is to be increased during the plan
period 230%. Development of new metal and plastic materials is to increase 25%; machine
building will increase 40-45% and investment in engineering is to increase 80%. There will
be special emphasis on the development of Siberia and the Soviet Far East, in the search for
and processing of new supplies of oil, gas and other natural resources, in the development of
hydroelectric power, in completion of the BAM (Baikal-Amur) main railway line, and the
new rail lines through Tommot and Yakutsk in Soviet Siberia. The Journal of Commerce,
supra note 79, at 3.
85. Of the total present (1985) Soviet foreign trade turnover (exports and imports com-
bined) of 141.6 billion rubles, the U.S. enjoyed only 1.5% of such trade. Presently the U.S.
ranks 15th among Soviet trading partners in terms of volume. Id. at 11. Energy and fuel
exports accounted for 52.8% of Soviet exports in 1985. By the year 2000, the Soviets expect
to double their gross national product. Id. at 24, 29.
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talist and developing country partners. Although the Soviet Union had,
since the beginning of its history some 70 years ago under Lenin, entered
into various joint venture arrangements with capitalists (particularly dur-
ing the time of the New Economic Policy beginning in 1921) such ar-
rangements were rare under Stalin. Following the rapprochement be-
tween the United States and Russia in 1972, a variety of limited joint
venture agreements were entered into with Americans and others."6 Nota-
ble among the ventures created were the development of a trade center in
Moscow by the Soviets and Armand Hammer, an old friend of Lenin, and
a marketing agreement with Pepsico.
The new Joint Enterprise (Venture) law8 7 is part of a wide ranging
restructuring of the entire Soviet economy and represents a well thought-
out effort on the part of the Soviet leadership to tap, in a systematic and
sustained way, the technology of the West to help revitalize the national
economy. 8 Among its stated aims is to develop trade, economic, scientific
and technical cooperation with the capitalist and developing countries on
a stable and mutually advantageous basis.6 9
86. Over the past 20 years the Soviet Union has entered into more than 50 licensing
agreements with companies in capitalist countries. See article by Yuri Dryomov, Head of
the Joint Ventures Department, U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Trade, prepared for The Wall
Street Journal, Aug. 24, 1987.
87. For a discussion of Soviet perspectives on this new law, see G. Zubov, Legal Aspects
of Improvement of Foreign Economic Activity of the USSR. Paper presented to the Legal
Committee, US-USSR Trade and Economic Council in New York (December 8, 1986).
88. Although the present joint venture law is new to the Soviets, the U.S.S.R. has had
many years of experience in working with western capitalists, beginning with Lenin's New
Economic Policy in 1921. It also has had the benefit of studying the successes and failures of
other socialist countries in developing a joint venture program, particularly Yugoslavia,
Hungary and China. The new Soviet law appears to have anticipated some but not all of the
problems encountered by the Chinese who were years behind the Soviets in developing a
modern legal system. See, H. Rogers, Jr., Deterrents to Joint Venturing in China: A Look
at Shanghai Real Estate Projects, 8 EAST ASIAN EXECUTIVE REPORTS (July 15, 1986) (discus-
sion of problems which have arisen in China under a similar law). Such problems included:
1) lack of confidence by westerners that profits will be adequate, 2) lack of capital security,
3) shortage of foreign exchange, 4) political risks, 5) lack of an adequate legal structure, 6)
problems in valuing contributions, and 7) the high cost of doing business in China.
Similarly see comments and detailed recommendations made to the Soviets in papers
presented to the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council on December 8, 1986, supra note
87: Shillinglaw, New Soviet Decree Permitting Joint Ventures of Western Firms and the
Experience of Western Firms with Joint Ventures in P. R. China, and Hitch, August 19,
1986 Soviet Decree Permitting Joint Enterprises between Soviet Organizations and For-
eign Firms From Capitalist Countries-Recommendations to Avoid Practical Problems.
89. Initial reactions among western businessmen to the new law have been guarded.
Many feel that they need more assurances that they will be allowed to tap the large Soviet
domestic market, and that clarifications will be provided with respect to presently vague
provisions of the law regarding labor costs, reserves and other matters. The Soviets are put-
ting the best face on the reception of their new program. Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir
Kamentsev reported that by April, 1987, the Soviets had received 200 proposals for deals.
Various U.S. companies have shown an interest. The Wall Street Journal, Apr. 6, 1987, at
20. By November, 1987 it was announced that Occidental Petroleum Company would enter
into a joint venture including the Soviets and Italian and Japanese firms for the construc-
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B. Formation"0
To form a joint enterprise, the Soviet partner must present to its
supervising ministry a copy of the proposed articles of incorporation or
charter and substantiating technical and economic documents. Following
clearance of the documents with the State Planning Committee, the Min-
istry of Finance and other concerned ministries or departments, the pro-
posal will be submitted to the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers for approval.
The approving authorities will be guided in their review by the need of
the country for the specific types of industrial output, raw materials, food
products, equipment and technology proposed to be provided by the ven-
ture and its capability to help the U.S.S.R. develop its export base and
reduce irrational imports."
C. Participants, Property and Rights of the Venture
The Soviet partner must own at least a 51% share of the initial capi-
talization and may include one or more legal entities under U.S.S.R. law.
The other partner likewise may consist of one or more foreign legal
entities.
The venture will be a legal person under Soviet law, fully responsible
to the extent of its assets for its own obligations, but not responsible for
liabilities of the Soviet state or any of its entities. Conversely, the Soviet
government is not responsible for the obligations of the joint venture.
The enterprise may enter into contracts, acquire rights in property, sue
and be sued. It must be financially independent. Its charter or articles of
incorporation will define its objectives, composition of its participants, in-
itial capitalization and governing procedure and will contain various other
provisions governing the rights and duties of the participating parties.
Upon approval and registration of the articles by the Ministry of Finance,
the venture will become a legal entity.
D. Capitalization
Contributed capital may be in the form of money or property such as
tion of a chemical complex to be built near the Caspian sea, valued at $6 billion. San Fran-
cisco Chronicle, Nov. 20, 1987. In addition Combustion Engineering had completed arrange-
ments for a joint venture to provide control systems for oil refineries and petro-chemical
plants. TME, Nov. 23, 1987, at 57.
90. The January 13, 1987 resolution adopted by the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, was
published in Pravda on January 27, 1987. Pravda, On the Procedure Governing the Crea-
tion, on USSR Territory, and the Activities of Joint Enterprises With the Participation of
Soviet Organizations and Firms of Capitalist and Developing Countries, Jan. 27, 1987. See
The Current Digest of the Soviet Press XXXIX, No. 6 (1987) at 15.
91. Ivan Ivanoff, the Deputy Chairman of the State Foreign Economic Commission of
the Council of Ministers, stated that when applications for joint ventures were processed the
government would take into account three goals: 1) to attract new technology and manage-
rial experience, 2) to stimulate import substitution, and 3) to expand Soviet exports. Wall
Street Journal, Aug. 24, 1987.
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buildings, equipment, rights to use land, water or other natural resources
and patents, technology or other property rights."' Contributions will be
valued in rubles at contractually agreed-upon values, bearing in mind
world market prices if applicable. Contributions of the foreign partner of
property or goods will be exempt from customs duties. The property of
the venture will be governed according to Soviet law and may not be req-
uisitioned or confiscated by administrative procedures. Any Party to the
venture may transfer its shares to third parties with the prior approval of
Soviet authorities, provided that the Soviet partner will have the right of
first refusal.
E. Dispute Resolution and Governance
Disputes between the venture and the Soviet state or its entities, or
disputes between the joint venturers, are heard by courts of the U.S.S.R.
or by consent in an arbitration court, either within or outside the Soviet
Union, as determined by the partners."
The governing body of the enterprise will be appointed by the par-
ticipants, which will follow decision-making procedures provided in the
articles. While the chairman of the board and general director of the en-
terprise must be Soviet citizens, general management may be provided by
both Soviet and foreign citizens.
The venture will adopt its own business plan, free from interference
of state agencies; 4 this, however, will not guarantee sale of its output."
The venture may independently conduct import and export operations
through its own foreign marketing operations or through Soviet foreign
trade organizations."
92. Yuri Dryomov observes that while adequately capitalized large corporations seeking
joint venture opportunities in the Soviet Union have expressed concerns about creating a
foreign subsidiary which would compete with the home corporation, small businesses, on the
other hand, while possessing useful technology, often lack sufficient capital. The U.S.S.R.
Ministry of Foreign Trade has explored the possibility of inviting certain foreign banks to
provide needed capital to such small businesses in exchange for an ownership share. Dry-
omov, supra note 86.
93. Ivanoff, supra note 91.
94. However, the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Trade will provide general supervisory
control over the joint venture. Dryomov, supra note 86.
95. To the extent that the Foreign Trade Ministry determines to make purchases of
products from the joint venture, it will pay the going world market price. If the product is
resold on the domestic market, the Soviet Government will price the product reflecting so-
cial goals. This might involve payment of subsidies, if products are resold domestically be-
low cost. Mathias, Turn Left Off Wall Street Into Red Square, International Herald Trib-
une, July 22, 1987.
96. The joint venture will operate in foreign markets under a general license from the
Ministry of Foreign Trade. For domestic trade within the Soviet Union, the joint venture
will sell and be supplied through the appropriate Soviet foreign trade organization on freely
contracted prices in competition with domestic producers. The competition is introduced
deliberately to force Soviet domestic firms to produce more efficiently and with higher qual-
ity. See Ivanoff, supra note 91.
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F. Finances
All foreign exchange requirements of the venture must be derived
from sale of its products on the foreign market."" Sale of output on the
Soviet market and delivery to the venture of raw materials and supplies
from the local market 8 must be paid for in rubles.
The enterprise may borrow from the U.S.S.R. Foreign Trade Bank,
or, with its consent, from foreign banks or firms" for its foreign exchange
needs, or it may borrow from the U.S.S.R. State Bank or the Foreign
Trade Bank if it requires a loan in rubles. Commercial terms may be ne-
gotiated. Interest will be paid on deposits made to the banks.
Reserves must be established by the venture to cover its operations
and requirements for the social development of its labor collective. Profits
available after payment of expenses and deductions to necessary reserves
are distributed to the participants in accordance with their proportionate
ownership. Foreign participants are guaranteed the right to extract their
profits in foreign exchange.
G. Taxation
A tax amounting to 30 percent of the net income of the joint enter-
prise, following deductions for reserves' 0 and research and development,
97. Soviet financial planners are conservative and wary of incurring hard currency debt,
and thus are unwilling to subsidize joint ventures with otherwise difficult to earn convertible
or hard currency. A principal source of hard currency for the Soviets (oil revenues) deterio-
rated sharply after world oil prices dropped in the early 1980's. Also reserves have been used
up to pay for necessary grain and food imports and to help Poland through the Solidarity
crisis. See Joan P. Zoeter, "U.S.S.R: Hard Currency Trade and Payments" Joint Economic
Committee, supra note 31, at 479.
Legal practitioners (e.g. Thomas Shillinglaw) have expressed concerns that the sections
of the joint venture law dealing with foreign exchange requirements are overly restrictive.
Although the law requires the venture to be self sufficient in foreign exchange (all foreign
exchange needs must be derived from proceeds of export sales) such needs for a new venture
can be substantial, considering required machinery, employee salaries, debt service, royalty
payments for foreign technology and eventual dividend repatriation. A start up venture
would have difficulty penetrating foreign markets quickly enough to cover operational
needs. Ventures should be able to sell to domestic markets in the U.S.S.R. and convert ruble
proceeds if the product sold, replaces what would otherwise be imported. Also ventures
which produce foreign exchange surpluses ought to be permitted to sell its foreign exchange
to those which are deficient.
98. Mathias, supra note 95. The joint venture may purchase raw materials and other
supplies wherever it chooses.
99. Although joint ventures must finance their own operations, lenders are likely to
look to the credit history of the Soviets, generally, in evaluating risks; the Soviet govern-
ment has had an excellent repayment record of its debts. During 1986, western banks made
nearly $4 billion in untied (general) loans to the Soviets. Total Soviet debt to western banks
is now nearly $36 billion, up from $21.8 billion in 1984. To help finance their proposed new
trade deals, the Soviets have indicated their desire to enter the Eurobond market and to
seek membership in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Editorial, Wall
Street Journal, July 23, 1987.
100. Supra note 92. Tax free reserves may be accumulated up to an amount equal to 25
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is assessed by the Ministry of Finance. The venture is exempt from tax
for the first two years of its operations. Tax appeal procedures are pro-
vided. An additional tax of 20 percent of the amount transferred abroad
is levied on the foreign partner at the time of transfer. Wages earned by
foreign employees are assessed an income tax of 13 percent.0 1
H. Auditing and Oversight
The participants are entitled to receive financial and other data nec-
essary to carry out their supervision of the venture. The enterprise must
maintain records required by U.S.S.R. state enterprises on forms pro-
vided by the Ministry of Finance and the Central Statistical Administra-
tion. Auditing is done for a fee by a Soviet auditing organization. Infor-
mation and reports concerning the joint venture may not be provided to
foreign state agencies.
L Personnel
The venture will be primarily staffed by Soviet citizens, although
management is free to hire foreign technicians on terms and conditions to
be negotiated by the parties.0 2 Contracts for Soviet employees must be
concluded with local collectives and must include provisions for social de-
velopment, terms of labor compensation, work and rest schedules, and
social security and insurance for the workers. The enterprise will remit
payments for social insurance coverage and pensions to the U.S.S.R. State
Budget Office.
J. Liquidation
The joint enterprise may be wound up in accordance with its articles
or terminated by the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers if its activities conflict
with its articles. After payment of debts, the residual value will be dis-
tributed proportionately to the participants, and may be withdrawn from
the country.
103
V. HISTORY OF U.S.-SOVIET TRADE
A proper evaluation of trade and joint venture proposals, now being
tendered by the Soviets, cannot be made without an understanding of the
history of U.S.-Soviet trade relations. Trade between the two superpow-
ers got off to a rocky start 70 years ago when the Bolsheviks came to
power and promptly repudiated the debts of the Czarist regime.'" The
U.S. and Britain, among others, offended the Bolsheviks by landing




104. See generally, J. GIFFEN, THE LEGAL AND PRACTicAL ASPECTS OF TRADE wrrH THE
SoVIET UNION (1971).
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troops on Russian soil during the chaotic period following the Bolshevik
revolution, when the Red and White armies were vying for control. From
1917, when Russia abandoned the war, until 1921, the Russian economy
was in a shambles. 0 5 Lenin's decrees to confiscate industry and other
measures designed to establish the communist state nearly ruined what
was left of trade following the turmoil brought about by the war. By 1923,
U.S. trade with the Soviets amounted to only 3.9 million rubles. In 1921,
Lenin recognized that his new nation was about to starve to death if dras-
tic and immediate changes were not made in the economy. As a conse-
quence, he instituted the New Economic Policy (NEP) which reinstated
capitalistic practices, but retained political control in the hands of the
Bolsheviks.
Although the United States did not recognize the Soviets until 1933
when Roosevelt came into office, it did become involved in trade through
private efforts before then. Armand Hammer and others established, with
Lenin's blessing,'"° a variety of joint venture trading and manufacturing
businesses in Russia.10 7 Immediately following the revolution, Herbert
Hoover (later U.S. Secretary of Commerce and President) headed up an
effort in Russia to provide food to the millions of starving people there.
105. Armand Hammer traveled by train from Moscow to Ekaterinburg in the Urals in
August, 1921. In his book HAMMER (1987) he describes what he saw along the way: "Every-
where we went we met the same condition-tremendous mills, factories and mine works
standing idle and the workers hanging about, hungry and despairing. Even if the mills and
factories could be put into operation, there was no market for their products, owing to the
economic stagnation of the entire country..." Id. at 108.
106. Hammer described his meeting with Lenin at the Kremlin in the summer of 1921,
in which Lenin urged Hammer to become one of the first foreign concessionaires under the
new economic policy: "Our two countries, the United States and Russia, Lenin explained,
were complementary. Russia was a backward land with enormous treasures in the form of
undeveloped resources. The United States could find here raw materials and a market for
machines, and later for manufactured goods. Above all, Russia needed American technol-
ogy. . ." According to Hammer, Lenin went on to say: "We need the knowledge and spirit
that has made America what she is today." Id. at 116. And in describing Lenin's demeanor
Hammer said: "To talk with Lenin was like talking with a trusted friend, a friend who
understood. His infectious smile and colloquial speech, his sincerity and natural ways, put
me completely at my ease." Id. at 118.
107. Fresh out of medical school, Armand Hammer, traveled to Russia in the summer
of 1921 before beginning practice as a resident in New York City. He brought with him a
complete field hospital, paid for with his own funds, and sought to help alleviate some of the
suffering he had read about, taking place in the land of his forbearers. Before the summer
was out, he had arranged a business deal to provide $1 million worth of grain to starving
peasants in exchange for Russian furs, and had come to the attention of Lenin himself.
Hammer decided to forsake his medical practice and stay in Russia to do business. He re-
mained there until the late 1920's and because of his special ties to Lenin, has remained a
friend and business benefactor of the Soviets ever since. At age 89, he is still active in con-
cluding massive trading deals with the Soviet Union. Id. at 109.
In 1973, with Brezhnev's help, his Occidental Petroleum Corporation, entered into long
term joint venture contracts with the Soviets to exchange fertilizer for urea and ammonia
(valued at $8 billion over a 20 year period), and to build an international trade center and
hotel in the heart of Moscow. Id. at 400. See also, The American Review of East West
Trade, May-June, 1973, at 15.
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In exchange for food, Hoover and his agents collected tons of books and
papers documenting the Bolshevik revolution which, happily for Western
posterity, he transported to his alma mater, Stanford University, for safe-
keeping and study by scholars from around the world.
Lenin encouraged trade with the U.S.: "We are resolutely for eco-
nomic accord with America, with all the countries, but especially with
America."108 In 1924, Amtorg Trading Corporation, a private company,
was established in New York to act as purchasing and selling agent for
Soviet trade corporations in the United States. By 1931, the Soviet Union
was the principal foreign purchaser of U.S.-made machines and equip-
ment. Some 1500 assorted American experts were in the Soviet Union. In
1937 a trade agreement was signed with Russia," 9 giving it Most Favored
Nation status. During the lend-lease program to Russia, American com-
panies shipped huge amounts of munitions and supplies to the Soviets in
a joint effort to defeat Hitler during the Second World War.
As the cold war descended over Europe and Asia following defeat of
the Nazis, trade relations took a sharp turn for the worse. In 1947, Con-
gress passed the Export Control Act"0 to limit the types of goods which
could be shipped to the Soviets and their allies; in 1951, following the
Soviet inspired invasion of South Korea, the U.S.-Soviet trade agreement
was cancelled altogether." 1 Trade nearly came to a standstill.'
With the beginning of the thaw in the Cold War in the 1970's, trade
began to increase. Nixon and Brezhnev signed a trade agreement in 1972
which reinstated Most Favored Nation status for the Soviets and a settle-
108. The Journal of Commerce, supra note 79, at 11.
109. However formal trade relations were initiated earlier on July 13, 1935 in "An
Agreement Regarding Commercial Relations with The USSR, 49 Stat. 3805, pt. 2.
110. Under the Export Administration Act of 1985, 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq., succes-
sor to the 1947 Act, the U.S., through the Department of Commerce, may control exports,
reexports, and trans-shipments of goods and technical data. This is handled through a li-
censing procedure. The purpose of the controls, among others, is to 1) protect U.S. national
security, 2) further U.S. policy, and 3) protect the U.S. domestic economy from shortages
and the inflationary impacts of abnormal foreign demand for goods. Export licensing applies
to a) export of commodities and technical data from the U.S., b) reexport of U.S. origin
commodities and technical data from one foreign destination to another, c) U.S. origin parts
and components used in a foreign country to manufacture a foreign end product for export
and d) in some instances, a foreign produced product using U.S. technical data.
Most U.S. exports require no specific U.S. approval. They are exported under a "gen-
eral license." No license application is needed if the goods in question are not on a restricted
control list maintained by the Department of Commerce. If a "validated license" is required,
the proposed transaction is reviewed to determine if the commodity or technology in ques-
tion would contribute to significant military use or promote the military-industrial base of
the importing country. See R. Starr, The Evolving U.S. Legal Framework for US-USSR
Trade," in BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH THE USSR 16 (1975). See also GIFFEN, supra note
104, at 9-42. Under the Act, the U.S. may cooperate with other nations having common
strategic interests to restrict exports of goods and technology. 50 U.S.C. App. 2402.
111. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, sec. 5, 65 Stat. 73 (1951).
112. Id.
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ment of the long outstanding lend lease debt was reached.113 The trade
bill was, however, subject to ratification by both Congress and the Su-
preme Soviet. After much debate,"" Congress attached a rider to the
trade bill making its approval conditional upon Soviet acceptance of the
so-called Jackson-Vanick amendment, which required them to halt cer-
tain human rights violations, principally their restrictions upon the emi-
gration of Soviet jews. Although during the 1970's the Soviets did permit
substantial emigration, they refused to formally agree to the provisions of
the Jackson-Vanick amendment, and the trade bill never took effect. " " A
side casualty was cessation of payment by the Soviets of the lend-lease
debt, made conditional upon effectiveness of the trade bill.
While other trade accords did go into effect," the failure of the
113. The U.S.S.R. had agreed to pay a small percentage of the total due on the lend
lease account. The settlement amounted to $722 million, payable $24 million per year until
the year 2001. See The American Review of East-West Trade (Dec. 1972).
114. Not only the Congressional, but the national debate over trade included wide
ranging considerations concerning U.S. policy toward the Soviets and its effectiveness in
promoting peace. See G. BALL, DIPLOMACY FOR A CROWDED WORLD 110 (1976) for a discus-
sion of some of the issues surrounding U.S. participation in Soviet trade.
115. While the Trade Agreement of October 18, 1972 did not become effective, in light
of the new Soviet trade offensive, renewed efforts will be made to resurrect and debate some
of its key provisions. These should be noted here.
Included in the 1972 agreement was a provision that MFN status would be provided to
each party. Other provisions set up a procedure for preventing disruption of domestic mar-
kets, provided for payment of goods to be made in freely convertible currencies, and for the
establishment of reciprocal commercial offices and business facilities. In addition the agree-
ment provided for arbitration of commercial disputes. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union
are parties to the "United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards," concluded in New York in 1958. See Starr, supra note 110, at 14.
The agreement also provided a waiver by the Soviet Union of sovereign immunity
claims by its foreign trade organizations (FTO's) See Paper presented to the US-USSR
Trade and Economic Council, supra, on December 8, 1986, prepared by Stephen A. Oxman
and Margery S. Bronster, "Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976-an Overview."
Under the Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391 (f), 1441 (d) and 1602-1611.
Foreign states are not granted immunity from suit in U.S. courts in cases involving their
commercial activities. This question becomes important in dealing with socialist countries,
where virtually all businesses are owned by the government. As to the origin of the doctrine,
see The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) and Verlinden,
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983). See also, Osakwe, A Soviet Perspec-
tive on Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Law and Practice, LAW IN THE SOVIET UNION (1984).
See Starr, supra note 110, at 1-24, for a discussion of the evolution of Soviet trade
agreements.
116. A grain agreement was'signed on July 8, 1972. This agreement provided for the
purchase of at least $750 million worth of U.S. grain by the Soviets for delivery over a three
year period. The grain agreement also permitted the Commodity Credit Corporation to pro-
vide credit to the Soviet Union. Soviet purchases in 1963 and 1971 had been for cash. Starr,
supra note 110, at 1. A lend lease settlement and a credit agreement, were signed in Octo-
ber, 1972. These agreements contemplated tripling trade over the next three years. Id. at 2,
3.
A Maritime Agreement was signed on October 14, 1972 permitting access by each of the
parties to 40 specified ports in the others's territory. This agreement and others negotiated
during the "thaw" of the 1970's have been renegotiated, or in some cases suspended as trade
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trade bill itself has denied the Soviets the coveted Most Favored Nation
status and U.S. government trade credits. In response to Soviet misbe-
havior, the Carter administration in, 1978, imposed export controls on oil
and gas equipment destined for the Soviet Union and instituted a variety
of boycotts, embargoes and sanctions.' 7 In 1980, following the Soviet in-
vasion of Afghanistan, the United States boycotted the Moscow Olympic
Games, placed an embargo on grain shipments to the Soviets and took
other measures which reduced trade by some 50 percent." '1 Additional
restrictions were imposed by the Reagan administration in 1982, following
Soviet intervention in Poland at the time of the Solidarity crises there.' "
Among other sanctions, the U.S. sought to dissuade its European allies
from participating in Soviet efforts to construct a gas pipeline from Sibe-
ria to Western Europe.'
20
Sensing that it was time to cool down the Cold War rhetoric which
had been building up during his first term, President Reagan in January,
1984, declared his intention to seek an expansion of trade with the Sovi-
ets. In May, 1985 the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission met in
Moscow after a hiatus of seven years. And in December, 1985, more than
400 U.S. businessmen travelled to Moscow as part of the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Trade and Economic Council, for meetings with Soviet trade officials,
highlighted by a welcoming banquet hosted by Gorbachev at the
Kremlin.
1 2 '
As part of their trade offensive, the Soviets are making concerted ef-
forts to influence the American Administration and Congress to remove
outstanding trade barriers. They recognize that improvement of trade is
closely linked to improvement of political relations between the two coun-
tries. Assuming satisfactory progress in this area, they cite specific barri-
ers which must be removed:
1 2
1. DENIAL OF MOST FAVORED NATION (MFN) STATUS. As a result of
the absence of MFN status, the cost to U.S. consumers of may Soviet
goods is 3 or 4 times higher than comparable goods from other coun-
tries, This makes it extremely difficult for the Soviets to find satisfac-
sanctions were imposed following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and other events. See
Brougher, Joint Economic Committee, supra note 31, at 419-453.
117. The Journal of Commerce, supra note 79, at 11.
118. J. CARTER, KEEPING FAITH-MEMOIRS OF A PRESIDENT 471-489 (1982). See also
Brougher, 1979-82: The United States Uses Trade to Penalize Soviet Aggression and Seeks
to Reorder Western Policy, Joint Economic Committee, supra note 31, at 419-453 (for an
excellent summary of sanctions imposed on the Soviet Union).
119. U.S. Department of the Treasury, US Government Policy on Economic Relations
with the Soviet Union, Joint Economic Committee, supra note 31, at 398.
120. Holliday, Foreign Economic Relations-Overview, Joint Economic Committee,
supra note 31, at 392.
121. The Journal of Commerce, supra note 79, at 29. The Trade and Economic Council
was scheduled to convene for its annual 1987 meeting in Moscow in December, but was
postponed until after the Washington, D. C. summit between Reagan and Gorbachev.
122. Id. at 29, 32.
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tory products to ship to the U.S. in order to earn dollars it needs to
purchase U.S. goods. The Soviets claim that the U.S. is its only trad-
ing partner not granting MFN status.
2. FAILURE TO GRANT GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED CREDITS, SUCH AS
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK GUARANTEES. 2 $ The Soviets say that such cred-
its are granted by the Western Europeans and Japanese, and, as a
consequence they are much more competitive as sellers than the U.S.
3. IMPOSITION OF RIGID EXPORT CONTROLS.' 24 Such controls are im-
posed, among other reasons, to deny the Soviets access to U.S. prod-
ucts deemed to assist them in their military efforts. The Soviets con-
tend that such controls are too broad, and that many of the products
denied to them by the U.S. are easily obtainable from Western Eu-
rope or Japan.
123. Under the 1972 credit agreement (later aborted by Soviet refusal to accept emigra-
tion provisions of the Jackson-Vanick amendment) the U.S. agreed to extend Export-Import
Bank credits and guarantees to the Soviets. Relations with the Bank were to be handled on
the Soviet side by the Soviet Bank of Foreign Trade (Vneshtorgbank of the USSR). For a
good general discussion of Vneshtorgbank and the Soviet banking structure, see Journal of
the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council (New York and Moscow), Vol. 11, No. 5/6
(1986), at 17, 28. See also article by Victor Gerashchenko, First Deputy Chairman of the
Board, USSR Bank for Foreign Trade, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 24, 1987. The Soviet gov-
ernment agreed to guarantee repayment of all Exim Bank credits extended to any of its
trading organizations. The U.S.S.R. also agreed to finance its exports to the U.S.. See Starr,
supra note 110, at 5.
124. In addition to controls imposed under the Export Administration Act discussed
above, the U.S. has controlled the sale of goods to the Soviet Union under a number of other
laws. For example, licenses are required for the export of certain military sensitive products
by U.S. government agencies including the State Department (arms), the Atomic Energy
Commission, Maritime Administration and others. See Starr, supra note 110, at 19. See also
Giffen, supra note 104, at 10. See generally J. BARTON & B. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND INVESTMENT-SELECTED DocuMENTs (1986), for an overview of applicable trade acts.
Also controls are imposed through COCOM (The International Coordinating Commit-
tee on Strategic Trade with Communist Countries). COCOM is an organization created by
the United States and 14 other NATO countries (except Iceland), and including Japan.
COCOM provides for voluntary export restraint by its members to help preserve mutual
security. Though control mechanisms are in place, COCOM members have been ambiguous
in their support of the program. While they recognize the need to restrict transfer of tech-
nology to the Soviets which would be of military value, western industry is anxious to do
business with Russia. See Tmz, Nov. 30, 1987, at 42. As a consequence COCOM has been
under funded, and under staffed, and this in turn has contributed to such inadequate over-
sight as the recent sale by Norwegian (Kongsberg) and Japanese (Toshiba) companies of
ship propeller manufacturing equipment to the Soviets which permitted radical reduction in
the detectability of Soviet submarines. (See Perle, Keeping Western Technology Western,
Wall Street Journal, July 23, 1987). COCOM publishes a list of embargoed items and
"watches" other commodities which it feels may become worthy of embargo in the future.
Starr, supra note 110, at 17. For a good discussion of the operation of COCOM and of
related controls, see Bayard, Pelzman & Perez-Lopez, An Economic Model of United States
and Western Controls on Exports to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Joint Eco-
nomic Committee, supra note 31, at 511-519.
Attempting to show some flexibility in technology sales to the Soviets, the Reagan ad-
ministration recently removed its objections to sale of basic "no frills" personal computers.
San Francisco Chron., August 19, 1987.
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4. A U.S. POLICY OF BOYCOTTS, EMBARGOES, SANCTIONS AND BROKEN
CONTRACTS, ALL OF WHICH MAKES THE U.S. AN UNRELIABLE TRADING
PARTNER. The U.S., unlike many of its allies, has used trade policy
with the Soviets to register its displeasure with Soviet political behav-
ior, such as invasion of Afghanistan, intervention in Poland, and
human rights violations.)
5. IMPOSITION OF OTHER TYPES OF RESTRICTIONS. Since 1951, the
U.S. has embargoed 7 types of fur skins produced in the Soviet Union
and has banned the importation of nickel, contending that it was pro-
duced through the of slave labor. Also the U.S. has imposed anti-
dumping and countervailing duties 2 " on products from the Soviet
Union, including titanium, potassium chloride,and urea, based on the
U.S. belief that these products are disruptive to the U.S. market and
are sold in the U.S. at prices below cost in the Soviet Union."2 6
VI. LESSONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE WEST
Economic restructuring in the Soviet Union presents the West, par-
ticularly the United States (as Russia's principal rival), with an opportu-
nity to radically change its relationship with the U.S.S.R. and to reap
substantial benefits which have eluded it for the 70 years the Communists
have been in power.
The most obvious immediate benefits on the horizon are substantial
cuts in armaments and a reduction in present heavy costs for defense.
Additional benefits are opportunities for increased mutual trade and a
general normalization of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship, including in-
creased cultural, scientific and social exchanges. In many ways, all of
these benefits are interdependent. However all of them arise from the
new Soviet consciousness that its economic system is not working and
that if it wishes to keep pace economically and culturally with the rest of
the world it, must make significant changes.
The West, with proper caution, should applaud and encourage the
changes, not simply to show the Soviets good will, but rather to help to
reduce ever-spiraling arms budgets, to increase foreign trade, to reduce
the U.S. trade deficit, and to benefit from increased interchange with So-
viet artists, scholars and scientists.12 7
A. Reducing U.S. Defense Costs
On December 9, 1987, President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev signed an agreement eliminating intermediate range nuclear
125. Under the Anti-Dumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671 et seq., the U.S. may levy
countervailing duties pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202 et seq.(the
Smoot-Hawley Act), as amended.
126. See Lazarus, Perspectives on the U.S. Role in East-West Trade, THE AMERICAN
REVIEW OF EAST-WEST TRADE, May-June, 1973, at 31.
127. See Editorial by Zukerman, Should the West Help Gorbachev?, US NEWS AND
WORLD REPORT, October 19, 1987.
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missiles. Although the agreement does not significantly reduce nuclear
arms stockpiles held by each nation,"" it is an important first step in
contributing to mutual trust.""' Hopefully it is also a prelude to a second
step in disarmament-a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear missiles
preliminarily, agreed to at Reykjavik. " "
Impetus for restructuring in the U.S.S.R. has come in large part be-
cause the Soviets find they cannot finance both "guns and butter.""
Large standing armies are depriving the civilian economy of necessary
manpower. Gorbachev and his advisors fear SDI not only because of the
nuclear risk, but also because of the cost.8 ' They find themselves being
drawn into an economic race they have no hope of winning.
Following Khruschev's humiliation in 1963, when he was forced by
President Kennedy to withdraw his missiles from Cuba, the Soviets em-
barked on a military buildup without parallel in modern history. " " Its
purpose was to prevent future embarrassment and to project Soviet
power world-wide. But because military industries were starving civilian
production and industrial renewal, the Soviets realized by the late 1970's
that their economy was not only failing to meet civilian demands, but also
threatened to curtail future military requirements.'" Thus, economic re-
structuring became a matter of national necessity, rather than a manifes-
tation of Soviet good will. To restructure the Soviet economy and to pro-
vide necessary reindustrialization, Gorbachev needs a period of repose."8 "
He cannot achieve his goals of meeting promises to Soviet citizens if his
128. The INF treaty will affect only about 4 to 6 percent of the nuclear arsenals held by
the superpowers in Europe. San Francisco Chron., November 26, 1987, at A29.
129. The Wall Street Journal, November 25, 1987, at 2. Under the proposed INF treaty,
the U.S. would eliminate missiles containing 350 warheads and the Soviets would destroy
missiles containing 1500 warheads.
130. M. GORBACHEV, THE RESULTS AND LESSONS OF REYKJAVIK 24 (1986).
131. US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, October 19, 1987, at 32.
132. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, SOVIET MILITARY PowER-1987 10 (1987).
133. See R. STARR, Soviet Union, THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1980's 744-749 (1980).
Over the decade prior to 1980, the U.S.S.R. spent about $150 billion for strategic offensive
weapons, about 3 times the amount spent by the U.S. By 1979 the Soviets outnumbered the
U.S. in nearly every class of military hardware and forces. Among twenty indices of military
power, the U.S. had an advantage in only four. For example the Soviets had 270 attack
submarines to our 77, 761 medium bombers to our 66, 4,690 fighter aircraft to our 3,400, 169
ground divisions to our 16, 53,000 tanks to our 10,500, 40,700 artillery to our 17,500, 1398
ICBM's to our 1054, and 90 ballistic missile submarines to our 41. The U.S. led the Soviets
in carriers, 12 to 3, heavy bombers 573 to 156, total warheads 8,526 to 6,132, and naval
aircraft 1,464 to 1,310. Starr, p. 745. This imbalance has been redressed in part by signifi-
cant increases in U.S. military expenditures during the Reagan administration. For example,
by 1989 the U.S. navy fleet will have grown from 479 to 600 battle force ships. SovIET MILI-
TARY PowER-1987, supra note 132, at 149. Notwithstanding, it has been estimated that
military expenditures in the U.S.S.R. have averaged 15 to 17 percent of the Soviet GNP,
about three times the comparable U.S. figure. See Sybert, The Reality of Strategic Defense,
Los ANGELES LAWYER, July-August, 1987, at 22.
134. SOVIET MILITARY POWER-1987, supra note 132, at 10.
135. See Broening, U.S. Debates how to Handle Soviets as Moscow Grapples with Re-
form, San Francisco Chron., Aug. 30, 1987, at A-5.
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limited resources and productive capacity must be redirected to a contin-
uation of the arms race, particularly an open-ended pursuit of "star
wars." 136 The economic turmoil in Russia is of direct benefit to the West
in encouraging the Soviets to enter into meaningful disarmament
agreements.
The cost of arms has not been easy for the U.S. Since 1980, President
Reagan, largely through his efforts to build up U.S. military might, has
added more than $1 trillion to the U.S. national debt,1 3 7 consequences
include consequent repercussions in foreign trade deficits, the plummet-
ing dollar on foreign exchanges and the recent crash of the stock market
in October.3 8
While President Reagan has denied that SDI is a bargaining chip,
1 3 9
the Pentagon has conceded that it will provide the basis for deep reduc-
tions in offensive weapons." 0 Due to the highly questionable merits of the
star wars program"', there is reason to believe that the Reagan adminis-
136. The Soviets see the SDI proposal as a snare to force them into an unending, eco-
nomically debilitating arms race and a means to enable the U.S. to gain a first strike capa-
bility over the Soviet Union. See McReynolds, Star Wars: Logic of the Past, reprinted from
The Bulletin of the War Resisters' League (USA), in SovmT PEACE COMMITrEE, XX CEN-
TURY AND PEACE (1986). See, in addition, M. GORBACHEV, THE RESULTS AND LESSONS OF REY-
KJAVIK (1986). Discounting Reagan's arguments that SDI would be deployed only for defen-
sive purposes, they point out that once the U.S. had emplaced space satellites capable of
locating and destroying Soviet missiles after launch, the U.S. could easily use these same
lasers or missile destroying guns to destroy Soviet missiles on the ground and thus force the
Soviets to capitulate to U.S. demands. See Manheim, Star Wars: A Dangerous Strategic
Gamble, Los ANGELES LAWYER, July/August, 1987, at 25, and McReynolds, supra.
137. For a good discussion of the military buildup during the Reagan administration
and the cost of the SDI program see N. COUSINs, THE PATHOLOGY OF POWER 179, 167-190
(1987).
138. TIME, Nov. 30, 1987, at 44.
139. The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 25, 1987, at 2.
140. SOVIET MILITARY PowER-1987, supra note 132, at 148.
141. Star wars detractors not only see merit in Soviet suspicions, but point out that the
scientists charged with developing SDI technology state publicly that technology does not
presently exist to provide any credible umbrella against Soviet missile attacks, and even if
sufficient progress is made to create such technology, substantial numbers of missiles would
still get through the defenses, and new counter-defensive measures would in the meantime
be developed. Manheim, supra note 136, at 23, states: "The overwhelming consensus of the
nation's technical community is that in fact there is no prospect whatever that science and
technology can, at any time in the next several decades, make nuclear weapons "impotent
and obsolete." quoting from McGeorge Bundy, Kennan, McNamara, and Smith, The Presi-
dent's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control, 63 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 264, 265 (1984).
Even after the expenditure of sums estimated to be up to $1 trillion (about 1/3 our pre-
sent GNP), we would still have no effective defense against nuclear missiles launched from
submarines or bombers. See Manheim, supra note 136, at 23. "SDI will be designed to inter-
cept only ballistic missiles taking a trajectory that puts them above the earth's atmosphere.
It could not handle cruise missiles, short or intermediate-range missiles (e.g., submarine or
air launched), bombs dropped from aircraft, or those delivered by any other means (e.g.,
smuggled by terrorists)." A Congressional study of SDI released in August, 1987 concluded
that depending on what countermeasures are taken by the Soviets, SDI could cost up to $1
trillion. Quoting from the Pentagon's Science Board the report stated: ". . . as a conse-
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tration has pushed SDI precisely because of its belief that the Soviets
cannot afford the race, and are being compelled to negotiate seriously on
arms.
B. Increasing Trade
As part of their trade offensive toward the U.S., the Soviets hold out
the prosect of greatly expanded trade and mutual benefits. Although the
Soviet Union is one of the largest potential markets in the world, the U.S.
must recognize that aside from certain commodities, the Soviets manufac-
ture or produce very few products of the type or quality which would be
of interest to the U.S. Furthermore, they presently have little available
foreign exchange with which to purchase U.S. products.
The U.S. should, however, look to the long term and attempt to culti-
vate a political and economic climate which will permit it to increase its
sales of products and services to the Soviets and also to augment its
purchases from them. The greater its trade with the U.S.S.R., the
stronger the mutual reasons are for remaining peaceful so that trade and
intercourse will remain uninterrupted. The U.S. must recognize, however,
that while the Soviets have historically sought trade with it, they likewise
have used trade, and their desire for advanced technology, to increase es-
pionage activities." '
quence of the current gaps in system design and key technologies, there is presently no way
of confidently assessing system performance system cost; or schedule." San Francisco
Chron., Aug. 2, 1987. See also San Francisco Chron., Aug. 8, 1987.
142. In order to obtain intelligence from countries which desired trade, but which
would not concede Soviet respectability by granting diplomatic status, the Soviets immedi-
ately following the revolution, began establishing trade missions and small trading compa-
nies to serve as covers for espionage. Such trading outposts were established in the early
1920's in Great Britain, Germany, the United States, and other countries. The U.S. com-
pany, Amtorg, was formed in 1924, through a merger of several smaller firms. It was head-
quartered in New York and charged with the task of coordinating Soviet trading activities
in the United States. As a collateral task, it could operate as a fully integrated Soviet for-
eign intelligence station with its own funding, and serve as a base for hundreds of visiting
"engineers," "inspectors," "accountants," and "trade experts." A Soviet trading company in
Britain called Arcos (All-Russian Cooperative Society) was believed by the British to be the
center for espionage in England. Within three years of its establishment in London, Arcos
was raided by the police and its officers and the Soviet embassy and diplomatic personnel
were expelled from Britain. W. CoRsoN & R. CRAwLEY, supra note 16, at 282, 283.
Corson, reports that beginning in 1941, under the cover of the US-Soviet lend lease
program, the head of the NKVD (Soviet secret police) dispatched approximately one thou-
sand NKVD and GRU (Armed Forces intelligence agency officers) to the United States to
serve as "purchasing specialists" along with various "experts" from Amtorg in New York.
While their mission was to buy anything thought necessary for Russia to win the war, as a
collateral duty, they were to bribe and attempt the subornation of any interesting, influen-
tial, or powerful American with whom they came into contract, and to obtain designs, draw-
ings, and patents of military and industrial secrets. Id. at 209.
Beginning in 1967 when Yuri Andropov became head of the KGB (later General Secre-
tary) the Soviets began a massive world-wide espionage effort to acquire Western and par-
ticularly U.S. military and industrial secrets. The North Vietnamese were used as surrogates
to capture and transport to Moscow for evaluation, U.S. military equipment. Through such
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As the United States evaluates how to respond to new Soviet trade
overtures, it must bear in mind that the KGB and its agents are an ever
present part of the Soviet government and foreign policy. While the U.S.,
through the CIA, does its best to keep tabs on the Soviets and their latest
technological achievements,1 43 it must be aware that industrial espionage
within the United States and every other Western country is a fact of life;
therefore, in its dealings with its trading partners, the U.S. must continue
to take all reasonable steps to guard against industrial espionage.
C. Increasing Cultural, Scientific and Social Exchanges
Coincident with the Gorbachev revolution in the economy has been a
substantial increase in scientific and cultural exchanges with the West.
Gorbachev has recognized that the Soviet economy cannot be restruc-
tured without changing fundamental beliefs and practices among Soviet
citizens.""' Unless the Soviets are open to new ideas and methods, creativ-
ity and motivation will remain low. Western ideas in all aspects of society
are increasingly dominating the changing Soviet culture. The Soviets are
hosting diverse cultural and scientific delegations in greater numbers14
and are straining domestic hotels and travel facilities in the process.1"4
means including intelligence obtained from American traitors, Andropov was successful in
providing the Soviet armed forces with a guide to upgrading its conventional forces without
the high costs of research and development. Id. at 340-344.
During Andropov's tenure as KGB chief, the Soviets greatly widened their acquisition
of Western technology. Part of the program involved subscribing to and acquiring every
available Western technical journal, including doctoral dissertations. This information
would be analyzed by Directorate T of KGB headquarters in Moscow, from which would be
developed a shopping list of high-tech hardware for acquisition. Everything on the list
which could be acquired legitimately would be purchased through normal channels. Items
which could not be so purchased would be acquired by illegal means, including 1) setting up
dummy corporations and purchasers to get around export restrictions, and 2) outright in-
dustrial theft. See BARRON, supra note 10, at 161-206 for a description of military and in-
dustrial thefts which have been perpetrated by the Soviets in the United States. Barron
estimates that the KGB and its military subsidiary the GRU have more than 400 officers
permanently stationed in New York, Washington and San Francisco to spy and conduct
active measures. Since 1975 at least 54 persons have been accused of espionage against the
United States. The recent trials of Marine Moscow Embassy guard Clayton Lonetree (ac-
cused of fraternizing with a Soviet woman who turned out to be a spy), and of former Navy
men Jerry Whitworth and the Walker family (who stole cryptographic information), have
captured the headlines. See San Francisco Chron., Aug. 30, 1987.
143. The CIA uses many of the same techniques as the KGB to secure vital industrial
and military information. See S. TURNER, SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY-THE CIA IN TRANSI-
TION at 48-60 (1985). See also P. AGEE INSIDE THE COMPANY-CIA DIARY (1975).
144. See Bialer, Marx had it Wrong. Does Gorbachev?, US WORLD AND NEWS REPORT,
Oct. 19, 1987, at 42.
145. See Information Moscow 1987-88, Western Edition (San Francisco, US Informa-
tion Moscow, 1987) at xxvi.
146. See article by Vladimin Lebedev, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 24, 1987. Intourist, the
official Soviet travel agency runs 107 hotels, motels and camping sites in the U.S.S.R. and
can accommodate 55,000 guests. By 1990 Intourist expects that 30 new hotels will be built
and that 13 older hotels will have been refurbished.
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Likewise, delegations of Soviet citizens, ranging from members of the
press, television, radio, government, science and the arts are finding their
way with regularity to Western capitals and outlying areas. 4" The U.S.
should encourage all such intercourse. As the Soviets learn more about
the West, and the West about them, there is a possibility of giving up the
sense of mutual hostility.
VII. CONCLUSION
The changes presently taking place within the Soviet Union are per-
haps the most significant since Stalin initiated the five year plans in 1928,
and arguably could have consequences as sweeping as the 1917 Bolshevik
revolution itself. The utopian Communist society envisioned by Marx and
Lenin has proved to be hopelessly elusive, and the socialist economy in-
stituted as a precursor to the "beautiful tomorrow" is failing to provide
Soviet society with the goods and services it needs to keep pace with the
more dynamic economies of the West.
Stalin proved that terror and oppression could compel fundamental
changes in Russian society and the economy, but the Soviets have learned
to their dismay that the innovation and creativity required by a modern
economy cannot be forced through dictates from the top; they have to be
generated through individual enterprise from the bottom.
While the comprehensive reforms now underway in Russia will most
likely prove successful over time, the benefits have not yet reached the
average citizen in terms of higher standards of living. The reforms, how-
ever, are being widely discussed and appear to have the approval of the
rank and file. Members of the bureaucracy and the Party which have not
been performing satisfactorily, stand to lose their jobs, power and perqui-
sites, and as a consequence are not enthusiastically embracing the
Gorbachev revolution. To counter this foot-dragging and to inject a sense
of meaning and life into the system, Gorbachev has enlisted elements of
democracy, including a critical press and local elections in the workplace
and in political units to pressure recalcitrants to get in line and remain
accountable.
Under the new laws proposed by the Party and approved by the Su-
preme Soviet, the Soviet economy is moving substantially closer in tone
and form to the Western capitalist economies. Central planners will set
goals for industry and explore ways to help them to achieve those goals.
Decisions as to buying, selling and pricing of commodities are to be made,
for the most part, by the local industrial unit, which now will have the
responsibility of remaining profitable without government subsidies. Gov-
ernment entities will place orders for their requirements with local manu-
facturers and, to the extent feasible, bids will be awarded competitively.
147. For example a contingent of high level Soviet scientists and others met with Amer-
ican counterparts recently at Chautauqua in up-state New York to discuss among other
things, the dangers of nuclear war. TIME, Oct. 5, 1987, at 69.
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Soviet theorists say the U.S.S.R. remains a socialist economy because the
principal means of production will continue to be owned by the State.
Under the new rules, however, workers can be paid whatever their serv-
ices are worth, without limitation.
Although there remain substantial differences between the new So-
viet and Western economies, the differences have narrowed considerably.
While small entrepreneurial businesses constitute a large part of a West-
ern, particularly the U.S., economy, these economies have become mixed
with substantial socialist elements. 4" Another element of convergence in
the two economic systems arises in the manner in which ownership inter-
ests are controlled. Under the new Soviet system, while the government
will continue to own principal industries, managers and workers will have
substantial freedom in establishing business plans, wages, salaries and
other benefits, including the distribution of profits. Such an evolution in
corporate structure and management is not essentially different from that
which presently exists in many large U.S. enterprises. 4"
Soviet economic reform will provide increased opportunities for
Western trade. The United States should carefully review its policies to-
ward the Soviet Union, especially in view of their efforts to make progress
toward the solution of some of the central problems separating the two
148. Consider, for example social security, medicare, unemployment insurance, social
welfare, and government subsidies to farmers, maritime interests and through military or-
ders to defense industries. At least one third of the U.S. gross national product (GNP) can
be said to be subject to planning from central governmental authorities, since at least that
much of the GNP is taxed by federal, state and local governments and redistributed to
citizens in the form of government services, military orders, health care and so on. Further,
through our tax system our government has vast influence over other parts of the economy.
Certain types of construction are encouraged through tax exempt treatment of municipal
bonds; subsidies in the form of tax write-offs such as depreciation and various exemptions
encourage other types of economic activity. While our society can be said to be planned
through governmental intervention, such intervention up to now, is essentially different
from that of the socialist dictatorships. Our planning has tended to provide incentives to
induce private conduct to satisfy governmental goals, rather than dictating quotas, wages
and the like. Galbraith argues that capitalism as an economic system, has essentially failed
to provide adequate housing, health care and transportation facilities needed particularly by
an urban society and that Western Europe and Japan have largely accepted that reality.
GALBRAITH, supra note 9, at 319.
149. To the average worker or manager of a large American corporation such as IBM,
General Motors or General Electric, it makes little difference who owns the shares of his
corporation, so long as he gets what he considers fair compensation. A worker or manager
may or may not have any ownership interest in the firm he works for. His union will help
him bargain for what he hopes is a fair wage. Ownership of large corporations for the most
part is diversified throughout the economy and held by pension funds, other corporations
and individuals around the country. So long as the shareholders receive what they feel is a
fair and predictable dividend, they are usually happy. This is not substantially different
from Soviet ownership by the government (the proletariat or workers as a whole). Under the
new Soviet system, although the government will remain the sole shareholder, it will impose
a tax for its share of the industrial output (its dividend) and the balance can be distributed
as management thinks best among workers in accordance with their productivity, without
artificial limitations as to amount of compensation.
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societies, such as arms control, internal freedom for their citizens and eas-
ier emigration.
Although Russia has endured a difficult and complex history, its tra-
ditions have been primarily Western. But for the skill and determination
of Lenin and the Bolsheviks in turning the revolution to their favor in
1917, Russia might well have succeeded in becoming a stable democratic
government following the turmoil of the First World War and the revolu-
tion. Those same democratic impulses are again being felt, and they may
become irresistible. The United States cannot forget that through the use
of the KGB and its predecessors, and consequent terror and rigid control
over its citizenry, the Soviets have remained in power for 70 years. They
are not likely to give up control easily, and there appears to be no sub-
stantial movement within the U.S.S.R. to overthrow the central authority.
Thus change in the Soviet Union will be gradual and at a pace approved
by Communist Party leaders. 5" Only time will tell whether the forces of
change now in play will irresistibly transform the communist society into
something substantially different, and similar in essential respects to
evolving Western societies and economies.
Both the Soviets and the West have common interests-survival..'
and, to the extent possible, prosperity. Through social intercourse, trade
and mutual reductions in armed might, The West should encourage the
Soviets to continue their quest for greater democracy and freedom, but
remain vigilant not to drop its own guard or reduce its strength to unac-
ceptable levels while the transformation is taking place.
150. At an historic meeting of the Community Party beginning on June 28, 1988,
Gorbachev proposed and got approval for a radical new government structure. The party
will continue to guide the country, but substantial power will be shifted to a new super
legislature called the Congress of People's Deputies, composed of 1500 nationally elected
delegates and 750 representatives of various trade unions and party committees. This Con-
gress would in turn select a standing legislature of 400 to 450 members, and a president to
oversee it. The president would have broad powers over domestic and foreign policy. See
N.Y. Times, June 30, 1988, at A6.
151. See Nixon, Superpower Summitry, 64 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1 (1985). In his new publi-
cation, Perestroika, supra note 8, Gorbachev has stated "Everyone seems to agree that there
would be neither winners nor losers in [a nuclear] war. There would be no survivors... We
are all passengers aboard one ship, the Earth, and we must not allow it to be wrecked. There
will be no second Noah's Ark." Id. at 11, 12.
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